history
It was the rejection of that notion which transformed English attitudes to slavery in the course of the 18th century. Domestic slavery was banned in common law in the 1770s. After a long campaign by evangelical Christians, the slave trade was criminalised by statute in 1807 and slavery itself abolished throughout the British Empire in 1834. The Foreign Office and the Royal Navy campaigned for its international suppression throughout the 19th century. Britain was decades ahead of the rest of Europe and the United States in recognising the moral case against slavery and taking active steps to suppress it. The size, reach and diplomatic and naval power of the British Empire were by far the most significant factors in the demise in less than a century of an institution that had subsisted across the world throughout history.
Unless we draw up a balance sheet of empire, we will never understand one of the most significant forces in the making of the modern world. Inevitably, it will be an incomplete balance sheet. There will be credits and debits, but no bottom line. This is because, as Biggar points out, the good and bad things about empire are incommensurate. Depending on one’s values, one can read Colonialism and conclude that the British Empire was on balance a very good thing or a very bad thing. But one cannot read it and plausibly suggest that there is nothing to balance at all.
Would India be better off if it had not inherited its subcontinental identity, its framework of constitutional government, its economic infrastructure and the rule of law from Britain? Would sub-Saharan Africa be better off if Europeans had left it to itself? Would the world be better off if Europeans had never settled in North America? These questions are surely worth asking.
The real objection to empires has always been that they denied self-determination to indigenous populations. Selfdetermination is a moral good, but it is not the only one. Our forebears thought that sound government was better than selfgovernment and that trade and economic and technical development were better for humanity than cultural autarky. This is not the modern consensus. But it is a morally defensible position.
j e f f r e y wa s s e r s t r o m
Tangled Tales of a Traumatic Time Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China’s Cultural Revolution
By Tania Branigan (Faber & Faber 304pp £20)
Long march: Xi Jinping doing farmwork, 1988
Tania Branigan reported from Beijing for The Guardian from 2008 until 2015, so Red Memory is part of a long and varied lineage of books about China by for- eign correspondents. Most such volumes are of merely transitory interest. A small percentage have enduring value, such as the New Yorker writer Emily Hahn’s publica- tions of the 1930s and Louisa Lim’s The People’s Republic of Amnesia (2014), which focused on the 1989 massacre that followed the Tiananmen Square protests and the struggles to suppress and keep alive mem- ories of that event.
Two articles by Branigan that ran in 2013 – the first full year of the Xi Jinping era – caught my attention at the time. One was a whimsical look at an isolated village with a disproportionately large number of centenarians. Branigan mixed deft scenesetting with comments from a range of residents who had interesting things to say about how to live for a long time – or scoffed at the notion of there being a secret to longevity. Here, I thought, was someone with a knack for evoking rural locales and getting people to talk in revealing ways.
The same qualities stood out in the other article. At its heart was a conversation in Beijing with a diehard defender of Mao who insisted that the official line on the decade of the Cultural Revolution – a ten-year stretch that began with Red Guards attacking people for allegedly being insufficiently loyal to
Mao in 1966 and ended with the Chairman’s death – was all wrong. The Communist Party did not swerve off course in Mao’s final years and then correct its trajectory under the reform-minded Deng Xiaoping. Mao was taking the country in the right direction; the derailment came with the veer towards capitalism late in the 1970s. The article opens with an eerie description of a village far from the capital devoted to the Chairman. Branigan describes a place devoid of any hint of Mao’s culpability for great suffering. ‘The East is Red’, a paean to the long-dead leader, ‘blasts through the speakers and echoes down the wide, empty streets, past the blazingly white statue of Chairman Mao,’ Branigan writes.
After reading those articles, I looked forward to the day I would hold in my hands a book by Branigan about Chinese villages in a time of rapid urbanisation. The book that she has written, however, is not that one. Yes, there are elements in it that fit with what first drew me to her work. One excellent chapter opens with the rural community that has become a shrine to Mao. Other strong chapters include striking depictions of visits to isolated locales, some of them in obscure urban settings rather than rural ones. ‘Luxuriant greenery crawled over marble monuments, immense and once stark white but now lichened and grey,’ she writes, describing a graveyard in Chongqing created to honour those who died in factional february 2023 | Literary Review 7