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4 NOVEMBER 2024 | LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE PRAGMATISM DOMINATES IN COMPLEX CALCULUS OF REGIONAL POLITICS The Gulf, and Egypt, watch and wait Egypt and the Arab Gulf have condemned Israel’s onslaught on Gaza and Lebanon but, rhetoric aside, have been content to sit on their hands. Each has its own strategic agenda and future to consider Akram Belkaïd | Translated by Charles Goulden Above Keep out: Palestinians displaced by the Gaza war at a makeshift camp at Gaza’s southern border with Egypt, which denies them entry, Rafah, Gaza Strip, 24 January 2024 Right Under siege: the occupation of Hebron worsens as Israeli settlers walk the streets of its Old City under the protection of the IDF, Hebron, West Bank, 9 March 2024 A few missiles would be enough to deprive Dubai of power and water, not to mention cause serious damage to the tourist industry The Arab states have made up their minds: despite un- believable violence against civilian populations and un- precedented destruction of urban infrastructure, almost no one will come to the aid of the Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, or of Lebanon.1 The old rejection front, formed after the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel in the 1970s, has melted away due to physical distance (in the case of Algeria) and civil war or state collapse (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen). As for the Gulf states, other than making a show of solidarity (notably at the United Nations), or maintaining an embarrassed silence, their leaders exhibit a combination of hypocrisy, a military inferiority complex and fascination with Israel – and of course concern for their own strategic interests. The United Arab Emirates (UA E ) has agreed to send a substantial amount of humanitarian aid to Gaza by road and offered to make troops available to help manage things there after the war, but has not forgotten its own agenda, a key element of which is maintaining good relations with Tel Aviv. Going back on the normalisation of relations with Israel enshrined in the Abraham accords, signed in August 2020 under the auspices of the US, is out of the question. Israel and the UAE are pursuing a variety of joint projects in new technology, defence and tourism. This dream scenario has survived the devastating intensity of the Israeli airstrikes on Gaza and the human tragedy they have caused, and the massacres in Gaza and Beirut. The UAE’s leaders acknowledge this unperturbed. The state media and a host of commentators with large so- channel Al-Arabiya, denouncing Hizbullah’s stranglehold on Lebanese politics and declaring that ‘Iran’s arms in the region will be cut off.’ This statement was above all a reflection of Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman’s (MBS) obsession with bringing down Hizbullah, which the Israeli army is now doing, to the considerable satisfaction of the Gulf monarchies. Even Qatar – often criticised for its closeness to the Muslim Brotherhood in general and Hamas in particular – is glad to see Iran’s capacity to cause trouble in the region reduced. The Gulf countries don’t go so far as to hope that Israel will ‘finish the job’ by attacking Iran: all know they have too much to lose cial media followings ceaselessly condemn Hamas for starting the war with no regard for the Palestinian people. Their Saudi Arabian counterparts take a similar view. Saudi Arabia is less enamoured of Israel than is the UAE , which it sees as both a partner and a rival. Talks on normalising relations with Tel Aviv are officially suspended,2 but in fact direct contact continues, especially on security issues. While the UAE has a small population (discounting foreign residents) and finds it relatively easy to keep them from expressing hostility to Israel, Saudi Arabia has 36 million, many of whom are still pro-Palestinian. The Saudi authorities have arrested several imams for preaching incendiary sermons against Israel, some with an antisemitic tone. Meanwhile, the small kingdom of Bahrain, a vassal state of Saudi Arabia which has also signed the Abraham accords, has suspended trade with Israel to calm public anger which threatened to trigger an uprising similar to the one in 2011.3 A waiting game In reality, all three are waiting to see how the regional balance of power evolves. The weakening of both Hamas and Hizbullah is playing into their hands: they are hostile to Hamas because it belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood, and to Hizbullah because it is an Iran-backed Shia militia. Former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri was briefly detained in Riyadh in November 2017 (before France intervened) because he refused to trigger a civil war in Lebanon by creating an armed Sunni organisation capable of taking on Hizbullah. Looking distraught, he appeared on Saudi satellite television These countries stop short of hoping that Israel will ‘finish the job’ by attacking Iran: all, especially the UAE , know they have too much to lose. If Iran were attacked, the Revolutionary Guards would not hesitate to lash out at its Gulf neighbours. A few missiles would be enough to deprive Dubai of power and water, not to mention cause serious damage to the tourist industry, which is an important part of the citystate’s economy. The Gulf states are therefore demanding that the US curb Binyamin Netanyahu’s warmongering (See Netanyahu’s bloody onward march, page 2). UAE crown prince Muhammad Bin Zayed (MBZ) made an official visit to Washington on 23-26 September for this purpose. President Biden responded by designating the UAE a ‘major defense partner’ of the US, a distinction the Emirati media presented as recognising their country’s importance on the world stage.4 During his visit, MBZ met several major political figures, including former presidents Bill Clinton and George W Bush, telling them all that the UAE was a firm ally of both the US and Israel, and urging Washington to prevent the current war from escalating. Egyptians have long memories Egypt shares this worry, though its reading of the strategic situation is different. On the evening of 7 October 2023, Egypt offered to help bring about a ceasefire, as it has done each time the Israeli military have intervened in Gaza. Its leaders have done everything possible to prevent the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from Gaza to Sinai. Egyptians, like others in the Middle East, have long historical memories and know very well that these refugees would never be able to return to Gaza, and would certainly become a political problem, even threatening Egypt’s domestic stability. Though President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi and his government have criticised Hamas’s ‘adventurism’, they are not necessarily hoping it will collapse. This pragmatic position is based on the current situation in Gaza, where no political force is in a position to take over from Hamas. Egypt’s leaders are well aware that the Palestinian Authority is totally discredited (see What future remains for Palestine?), and would be reluctant to have an international peacekeeping force deployed in a territory within its zone of influence. Moreover, from Egypt’s standpoint, Hamas has been useful in keeping the Israelis busy and giving Cairo a strategic role as a mediator. Unfortunately, a year on from the 7 October attacks, Israel has taken back control of Gaza’s southern border where it now finds itself face to face with Egypt for the first time in decades. If Israeli settlers were to return to the Strip, Tel Aviv’s border security requirements would grow stricter and Egypt would find itself in the uncomfortable position of having to comply with them. What worries Egypt most is Israel’s hubris. Cairo has not failed to notice the rallies organised by members of Likud and representatives of farright Zionist parties to demand the resettlement of Gaza, followed by the establishment of a ‘Greater Israel’. And the many speeches to that effect made by national security minister Itamar Ben Gvir and finance minister Bezalel Smotrich. Both regularly declare themselves in favour of an Israeli state that would include parts of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Sinai and even eastern Egypt. In the last few weeks, many Egyptians have shared images on social media of Israeli troops in Gaza wearing a shoulder badge that depicts a map of Greater Israel. For now, Iraqis and Saudis shrug at the idea that Israelis dream of annexing parts of their countries, but the Lebanese have not forgotten that the original Zionist project called for the state of Israel to include southern Lebanon. And in Egypt, besides the fact that a large part of the population is hostile to Israel, many of the elite have still not accepted the 1979 peace agreement.5 The Egyptian elite are concerned by Netanyahu’s hardline military stance and the way his political allies are calling for new territorial conquests. Sources say the army high command are considering whether to scale up Egypt’s defence effort and preventatively remilitarise Sinai, since the war could come to them at any time • Akram Belkaïd is editor in chief of Le Monde diplomatique G E T T Y · A F P 1 See Akram Belkaïd, ‘The Arab world’s resounding failure’, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, March 2024 2 See Hasni Abidi and Angélique Mounier-Kuhn, ‘Saudi-Israel normalisation talks halted’, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, November 2023 3 See Marc Pellas, ‘Bahrain unreformed’, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, December 2021 4 Fatiha Dazi-Héni, ‘The United Arab Emirates take a risky but winning gamble in the Middle East’, 18 October 2024, orientxxi.info 5 Marwa El-Shinawy, ‘Netanyahu revives the greater Israel plan’, 15 October 2024, www.dailynewsegypt.com
page 5
LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE | NOVEMBER 2024 5 ‘NOT THE END OF THE WAR IN GAZA’, BUT IS IT EVEN THE 'BEGINNING OF THE END'? What future remains for Palestine? With arbitrary arrests and plans for mass expulsions, Israel’s far-right government is using the war against Hamas as cover for settling the Palestinian question once and for all, in Gaza and the West Bank Thomas Vescovi | Translated by Charles Goulden G E T T Y · L U A N A D O · I S H A L L O D E R A M It was clear within hours that the kill- ing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in southern Gaza on 16 October wouldn’t bring an end to the war any closer; as Prime Minister Binyam- in Netanyahu put it, ‘This is not the end of the war in Gaza, it is the beginning of the end.’ He made it plain that he still favours the use of force over negotiations to free the Israeli hostages. Khalil al-Hayya, a member of Hamas’s politburo and leader of the Palestinian negotiating team, said no hostages would be freed without a ceasefire involving the IDF ’s withdrawal from Gaza and the release of Palestinian prisoners. For both sides, it’s a matter of political survival: Hamas won’t accept peace on unfavourable terms given the heavy price the people of Gaza have paid since 7 October 2023 and the bleak future facing the Palestinian territories. Netanyahu, between trials for corruption and polls forecasting uncertain election prospects, is struggling to hold his far-right coalition together. Tel Aviv’s strategy doesn’t suggest a peace agreement is imminent. Israel’s leaders oppose both the deployment of international peacekeepers and the PA’s return to power, and are pressing for at least some troops to stay on in Gaza, especially to control the border with Egypt and border crossings with Israel. The Israeli army (IDF ) is thought to have taken control of at least 26% of the Gaza Strip, building bases and roads like the Netzarim corridor, which cuts the enclave in two.1 Dividing up the territory in this way makes it possible to screen Palestinians authorised to move to the north of the Strip and better organise its administration. Most of all, this reinforced military presence could facilitate the eventual return of Israeli settlers. In the past few months, conferences have been held in Israel advocating resettlement (especially of northern Gaza) as soon as the territory is ‘cleaned up’: the most recent such event, organised by Likud, took place on 21 October. This dynamic seems to be gathering momentum as plans accelerate to evacuate all residents of northern Gaza under the Order and Clean-up programme, sometimes called the ‘generals’ plan’ or ‘Eiland plan’ after the general who proposed it. Whether the programme will go ahead remains uncertain, but an investigation by the online +972 Magazine has revealed its key elements and objectives.2 It involves the ‘total defeat’ of Hamas, then a process of ‘deradicalisation’; the idea is that evacuating the 300,000 Palestinians still living north of the Netzarim corridor will enable the IDF to establish an unbreakable siege of Hamas in this area, and orders to this effect were issued on 6 October this year. A second stage will trap Palestinian fighters in ‘closed military zones’, forcing them to surrender or starve to death, without regard for any hostages who might be held there. This strategy is already in place at the Jabaliya camp, which has been under siege since 12 October.3 West Bank facing annexation Meanwhile, the opposition are keeping up the pressure on Netanyahu with demonstrations. The prime minister disbanded his war cabinet on 17 June after two major figures resigned: Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot, supported by several IDF generals, criticise Netanyahu for not having a day after plan and sabotaging the hostages deal. It’s claimed he has interfered repeatedly in talks, yielding to pressure from far-right allies who threaten to bring down the coalition if a peace agreement is signed. For both sides, it’s a matter of political survival: Hamas won’t accept peace on unfavourable terms; Netanyahu is struggling to hold his coalition together At the same time, the West Bank’s administration is being transferred from the IDF, as the occupying force, to Israel’s finance minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also represents the settlers. This will make settlement still easier and lead to de facto annexation. On 3 July the government approved the seizure of nearly 13 sq km of land in the Jordan valley, the largest confiscation of land in the West Bank since 1993 (see West Bank violence reaches new heights, page 9). More than 700 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank since 7 October 2023, mainly during IDF operations to mop up pockets of resistance. Stepping up this repressive settlement policy has enabled Netanyahu to consolidate his coalition, while the elimination of Hamas and Hizbullah leaders has galvanised his voters. And not just that: several polls find it has restored his declining popularity, suggesting that he would come first if an election were to be held soon. In any case, sidelining the extreme rightwing factions that control a number of key ministries, including national security, won’t end the apartheid regime Israel has imposed on the Palestinians. Apart from the nationalist Gantz, Yair Lapid continues to represent a secular and liberal Zionist opposition though he justifies settlement with talk of ‘Biblical lands’ (on news channel LCI , 6 November 2023). Worse, Lapid wrote in a Haaretz op-ed of giving Palestinians a form of sovereignty only if they can prove they are as docile as the Swiss, pacifist as the Dutch, and calm as the Australians.4 In other words, that they passively agree to be deprived of any rights. Netanyahu’s strategy of resisting pressure and playing for time is paying off. It could even exceed expectations if Donald Trump is reelected. Netanyahu hopes to renew the alliance that once enabled him to remove the Palestinian question from the diplomatic agenda and score a series of coups, including getting the US embassy moved to Jerusalem and stopping funding of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). The national movement struggles Internationally, support for the Palestinians is stronger than ever. In May an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly passed a resolution recommending that the Security Council give ‘favourable consideration’ to full Palestinian membership of the United Nations Organisation (despite a US veto on this in April) and upgrading Palestine’s rights at the world body as an observer state.5 In September the General Assembly demanded an end to the occupation of the Palestinian territories within 12 months. Yet, the Palestinian national movement’s future is in the balance, with disagreements between the major factions (which predate October 2023). Meetings held in Moscow in March and Beijing in April do not seem to have produced the unity they need to discuss what may happen after the war PA president Mahmoud Abbas continues to lose credibility, with satisfaction in his performance down to just 14% according to a poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.6 The arrival of a new government led by economist Mohammad Mustafa – a former advisor to Abbas and senior World Bank official – caused an outcry. Hamas issued a communiqué denouncing the choice of Mustafa (nominated by Abbas) as going against the ‘national consensus’ and claiming it could only worsen divisions between Palestinians. In a particularly vehement response, Fatah castigated Hamas for unilaterally making the decision to launch the 7 October 2023 attacks, accusing it of serving ‘foreign agendas’.7 The people of Gaza are surely angry with Hamas and its leaders, given the humanitarian disaster they are living through, but the organisation has survived the Israeli invasion and succeeded in putting the Palestinian question back on the international agenda. The death of Yahya Sinwar may be the end of an era in Hamas’s history, but is probably not the end of the organisation itself. The West’s reluctance to deal with Hamas because of its crimes against Israel is no doubt justified, but there is no ignoring its strength. Despite its undeniably reduced capacity to wage war, Hamas survives because it can still recruit new members, maintain a degree of armed activity, and, above all, ensure that any future government must take it into account. The organisation’s survival is also due in part to Sinwar’s image, which Israel itself helped to create. Over the last few months there were rumours that he had fled overseas or was hiding in underground bunkers using hostages as human shields, but video footage released by the IDF shows the 62-year-old on the front line, in battledress, with what appears to be a keffiyeh covering his face. He has a badly injured arm and is sitting in an armchair in the ruins of a block of flats, staring at the drone that is filming him. Widely shown on air and shared on social media, the clip made Sinwar a hero. But even more than by its leaders’ images or ideology, the Palestinian armed resistance is fuelled by resentment of the impunity Israel continues to enjoy after more than one year of a war whose genocidal nature is becoming ever more apparent. With Palestinians facing repression and displacement on a scale unprecedented since 1948, Hamas is seen as the direct opposite of the Fatah-controlled PA, which collaborates with the Israelis and ignores the needs of those it represents. For that reason – unless there is international pressure to release Palestinian prisoners who could in turn breathe new life into Arab politics – nothing can be achieved without Hamas. Starting with unifying the Palestinian national movement • Thomas Vescovi is a doctoral student in politi- cal science and a member of Yaani.fr’s editorial committee 1 Yarden Michaeli and Avi Scharf, ‘Road to redemption. How Israel’s war against Hamas turned into a springboard for Jewish settlement in Gaza’, 8 July 2024, www.haaretz.com 2 Meron Rapoport, ‘A plan to liquidate northern Gaza is gaining steam’, 17 September 2024, www.972mag.com 3 Mahmoud Naffakh, ‘Nord de Gaza: L’extermination méthodique des habitants de Jabaliya’ (North of Gaza: The systematic extermination of the residents of Jabaliya), 17 October 2024, orientxxi.info 4 Yair Lapid, ‘Israel’s hostages in Gaza are the most urgent mission’, Haaretz, Jerusalem, 28 April 2024 5 At present, Palestine is only a ‘permanent observer state’ 6 ‘Public Opinion Poll no 91’, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 15 April 2024, pcpsr.org 7 ‘Fatah says “whoever caused Israel’s reoccupation of Gaza doesn’t dictate national priorities” ’, 15 March 2024, english.wafa.ps

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NOVEMBER 2024 | LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE

PRAGMATISM DOMINATES IN COMPLEX CALCULUS OF REGIONAL POLITICS

The Gulf, and Egypt, watch and wait Egypt and the Arab Gulf have condemned Israel’s onslaught on Gaza and Lebanon but, rhetoric aside, have been content to sit on their hands. Each has its own strategic agenda and future to consider Akram Belkaïd | Translated by Charles Goulden

Above Keep out: Palestinians displaced by the Gaza war at a makeshift camp at Gaza’s southern border with Egypt, which denies them entry, Rafah, Gaza Strip, 24 January 2024 Right Under siege: the occupation of Hebron worsens as Israeli settlers walk the streets of its Old City under the protection of the IDF, Hebron, West Bank, 9 March 2024

A few missiles would be enough to deprive Dubai of power and water, not to mention cause serious damage to the tourist industry

The Arab states have made up their minds: despite un- believable violence against civilian populations and un- precedented destruction of urban infrastructure, almost no one will come to the aid of the Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, or of Lebanon.1 The old rejection front, formed after the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel in the 1970s, has melted away due to physical distance (in the case of Algeria) and civil war or state collapse (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen).

As for the Gulf states, other than making a show of solidarity (notably at the United Nations), or maintaining an embarrassed silence, their leaders exhibit a combination of hypocrisy, a military inferiority complex and fascination with Israel – and of course concern for their own strategic interests.

The United Arab Emirates (UA E ) has agreed to send a substantial amount of humanitarian aid to Gaza by road and offered to make troops available to help manage things there after the war, but has not forgotten its own agenda, a key element of which is maintaining good relations with Tel Aviv. Going back on the normalisation of relations with Israel enshrined in the Abraham accords, signed in August 2020 under the auspices of the US, is out of the question.

Israel and the UAE are pursuing a variety of joint projects in new technology, defence and tourism. This dream scenario has survived the devastating intensity of the Israeli airstrikes on Gaza and the human tragedy they have caused, and the massacres in Gaza and Beirut. The UAE’s leaders acknowledge this unperturbed. The state media and a host of commentators with large so-

channel Al-Arabiya, denouncing Hizbullah’s stranglehold on Lebanese politics and declaring that ‘Iran’s arms in the region will be cut off.’

This statement was above all a reflection of Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman’s (MBS) obsession with bringing down Hizbullah, which the Israeli army is now doing, to the considerable satisfaction of the Gulf monarchies. Even Qatar – often criticised for its closeness to the Muslim Brotherhood in general and Hamas in particular – is glad to see Iran’s capacity to cause trouble in the region reduced.

The Gulf countries don’t go so far as to hope that Israel will ‘finish the job’ by attacking Iran: all know they have too much to lose cial media followings ceaselessly condemn Hamas for starting the war with no regard for the Palestinian people.

Their Saudi Arabian counterparts take a similar view. Saudi Arabia is less enamoured of Israel than is the UAE , which it sees as both a partner and a rival. Talks on normalising relations with Tel Aviv are officially suspended,2 but in fact direct contact continues, especially on security issues. While the UAE has a small population (discounting foreign residents) and finds it relatively easy to keep them from expressing hostility to Israel, Saudi Arabia has 36 million, many of whom are still pro-Palestinian. The Saudi authorities have arrested several imams for preaching incendiary sermons against Israel, some with an antisemitic tone. Meanwhile, the small kingdom of Bahrain, a vassal state of Saudi Arabia which has also signed the Abraham accords, has suspended trade with Israel to calm public anger which threatened to trigger an uprising similar to the one in 2011.3

A waiting game

In reality, all three are waiting to see how the regional balance of power evolves. The weakening of both Hamas and Hizbullah is playing into their hands: they are hostile to Hamas because it belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood, and to Hizbullah because it is an Iran-backed Shia militia. Former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri was briefly detained in Riyadh in November 2017 (before France intervened) because he refused to trigger a civil war in Lebanon by creating an armed Sunni organisation capable of taking on Hizbullah. Looking distraught, he appeared on Saudi satellite television

These countries stop short of hoping that Israel will ‘finish the job’ by attacking Iran: all, especially the UAE , know they have too much to lose. If Iran were attacked, the Revolutionary Guards would not hesitate to lash out at its Gulf neighbours. A few missiles would be enough to deprive Dubai of power and water, not to mention cause serious damage to the tourist industry, which is an important part of the citystate’s economy.

The Gulf states are therefore demanding that the US curb Binyamin Netanyahu’s warmongering (See Netanyahu’s bloody onward march, page 2). UAE crown prince Muhammad Bin Zayed (MBZ) made an official visit to Washington on 23-26 September for this purpose. President Biden responded by designating the UAE a ‘major defense partner’ of the US, a distinction the Emirati media presented as recognising their country’s importance on the world stage.4 During his visit, MBZ met several major political figures, including former presidents Bill Clinton and George W Bush, telling them all that the UAE was a firm ally of both the US and Israel, and urging Washington to prevent the current war from escalating.

Egyptians have long memories

Egypt shares this worry, though its reading of the strategic situation is different. On the evening of 7 October 2023, Egypt offered to help bring about a ceasefire, as it has done each time the Israeli military have intervened in Gaza. Its leaders have done everything possible to prevent the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from Gaza to Sinai. Egyptians, like others in the Middle East, have long historical memories and know very well that these refugees would never be able to return to Gaza, and would certainly become a political problem, even threatening Egypt’s domestic stability.

Though President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi and his government have criticised Hamas’s ‘adventurism’, they are not necessarily hoping it will collapse. This pragmatic position is based on the current situation in Gaza, where no political force is in a position to take over from Hamas. Egypt’s leaders are well aware that the Palestinian Authority is totally discredited (see What future remains for Palestine?), and would be reluctant to have an international peacekeeping force deployed in a territory within its zone of influence.

Moreover, from Egypt’s standpoint, Hamas has been useful in keeping the Israelis busy and giving Cairo a strategic role as a mediator. Unfortunately, a year on from the 7 October attacks, Israel has taken back control of Gaza’s southern border where it now finds itself face to face with Egypt for the first time in decades. If Israeli settlers were to return to the Strip, Tel Aviv’s border security requirements would grow stricter and Egypt would find itself in the uncomfortable position of having to comply with them.

What worries Egypt most is Israel’s hubris. Cairo has not failed to notice the rallies organised by members of Likud and representatives of farright Zionist parties to demand the resettlement of Gaza, followed by the establishment of a ‘Greater Israel’. And the many speeches to that effect made by national security minister Itamar Ben Gvir and finance minister Bezalel Smotrich.

Both regularly declare themselves in favour of an Israeli state that would include parts of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Sinai and even eastern Egypt. In the last few weeks, many Egyptians have shared images on social media of Israeli troops in Gaza wearing a shoulder badge that depicts a map of Greater Israel.

For now, Iraqis and Saudis shrug at the idea that Israelis dream of annexing parts of their countries, but the Lebanese have not forgotten that the original Zionist project called for the state of Israel to include southern Lebanon. And in Egypt, besides the fact that a large part of the population is hostile to Israel, many of the elite have still not accepted the 1979 peace agreement.5

The Egyptian elite are concerned by Netanyahu’s hardline military stance and the way his political allies are calling for new territorial conquests. Sources say the army high command are considering whether to scale up Egypt’s defence effort and preventatively remilitarise Sinai, since the war could come to them at any time • Akram Belkaïd is editor in chief of Le Monde diplomatique

G E T T Y

·

A F P

1 See Akram Belkaïd, ‘The Arab world’s resounding failure’, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, March 2024 2 See Hasni Abidi and Angélique Mounier-Kuhn, ‘Saudi-Israel normalisation talks halted’, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, November 2023 3 See Marc Pellas, ‘Bahrain unreformed’, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, December 2021 4 Fatiha Dazi-Héni, ‘The United Arab Emirates take a risky but winning gamble in the Middle East’, 18 October 2024, orientxxi.info 5 Marwa El-Shinawy, ‘Netanyahu revives the greater Israel plan’, 15 October 2024, www.dailynewsegypt.com

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