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8JANUARY 2008 Le Monde diplomatique Should we scrap Kyoto? M ost scientists now agree that unless we limit greenhouse gas emissions,the planet could heat up by between 1.4oC and 5.8oC by the end of the century,with catastrophic consequences. Governments acknowledged the problem by signing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the second Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.Since then there have been regular negotiations at both international and national levels. Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,the international community accepted the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and agreed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Thirty industrialised nations signed up;developing countries took part in the negotiations but were exempted from specific reduction goals.Opposition from the planet’s leading polluter,the United States,which was required to reduce emissions by 7%,delayed the implementation of the protocol until February 2005.But 168 states have now ratified it – an indication of its importance. But as new economic powers like China and India emerge,energy use continues to increase.More than ever,looking beyond the Kyoto Protocol,the campaign to combat wastage,to increase energy efficiency and to replace fossil fuels with renewable resources is absolutely crucial. The first phase of the Kyoto Protocol is due to end soon,in 2012. The aim of December’s Bali conference was to set an agenda for negotiations on a global agreement on new methods of application to extend Kyoto beyond 2012.But contradictions remain.Developing countries from the Group of 77 have reminded the industrialised nations of their historic responsibility and want them to lead the way in cutting pollution.In September President George Bush organised a meeting of the world’s 17 leading polluters in Washington,at the end of which the US administration maintained its opposition to mandatory limits on carbon output.In a more positive development,China gave its support to the protocol as “the basis for any future international agreement on climate change”. Although it is inconceivable that there should be no agreement to cover the period after 2012,it would be stupid to regard Kyoto as the miracle solution. The protocol’s positive achievements are undermined by perverse effects.Some of its “flexible mechanisms” do nothing to help the structural reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.While defending Kyoto,we must also ask some very serious questions. BY AURÉÉLIEN BERNIER The concept of environmental taxes dates back to 1920, when the British economist Arthur Cecil Pigou outlined the concept of “externality”: the impact upon an uninvolved party of any act of production or consumption (1). He described how hot cinders from steam locomotives could set fire to land alongside the railway tracks. Pigou suggested that a tax on such damage, imposed on the railway companies, would act as an incentive to stop cinders from escaping. This argument is the basis of the principle that the polluter should pay. Forty years later another British economist, Ronald Coase, insisted it would be better to leave the market to itself since state intervention would generate transaction costs (2). The best economic result would be obtained if the victims of trackside fires negotiated directly with the railway companies, which could resolve the problem by owning the adjacent land themselves. The Coase Theorem states that the assignment of rights is economically meaningless: it is unhelpful for the owner of the adjacent land to have a right not to be the victim of fires, or for the company to have the right to cause them. Nevertheless, in 1970 the US government responded to chronic atmospheric pollution by extending an earlier Clean Air Act to impose strict limits. Two years later the Club of Rome, a global think tank, published a report, “The Limits to Growth” (3), that warned of a catastrophic future if the human race failed to take account of the environmental dimension. A correlation was suggested between the concentration of CO2in the atmosphere and climate change; discussions on the greenhouse effect became increasingly common. But when US industry failed to respect the Clean Air Act, the government reacted by weakening the act’s provisions. In 1990 it introduced a system of emissions trading that fixed targets for reducing the sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions that are responsible for acid rain. This initially awarded 110 heavy polluters permits to emit SO2, then allowed them to trade these rights on a free market. The hope was that improvements would occur first where the investment costs involved were lowest, and that the surplus authorisations thus generated would be sold to plants emitting more pollution than they had been allocated. Heavy fines would be imposed upon any company whose actual SO2emissions exceeded its annual allocation. This system apparently respected Coase’s prescriptions by letting the market operate freely. The Acid Rain programme was successful: the target of a 40% reduction in SO2emissions compared with 1980 was met and even exceeded. But this dramatic fall was largely due to the fact that many polluters cleaned up their act in anticipation of ongoing regulation and limits, and that the coal industry developed competitive low-sulphur products. The impact of market trading was marginal (4). Anyway, there were serious secondary consequences: because the new coal generated less heat, more had to be burned, which inevitably increased emissions of another pollutant, CO2. But disciples of state non-intervention drew a single conclusion: the market in quotas had worked and must therefore be extended. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up in 1988 to warn of the consequences of global warming. In 1992 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was presented for ratification, and was welcomed by most countries. Its stated objective was “to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere”. But it failed to set out specific targets or how they should be achieved. Instead it provided for subsequent updates: the most important was the Kyoto Protocol for which negotiations began in December 1997. Since the UN’s framework required unanimity, the battle between industrialised and developing countries was fierce. It was four years before the legal framework was settled by the Marrakesh accords of November 2001. The US withdrew from Kyoto after the Senate voted unanimously against ratification. This limited the protocol’s scope to 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions. So the commitment to reduce emissions to 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2012 actually represents only a 2% reduction overall. Taking into account the fact that, at the time of the negotiations, emissions had alreadyfallen by 4.8% compared with 1990 (5), the real target falls to a reduction of 0.16% in the quantity of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere (6)! This figure is so pathetic, given the stakes, that has it never appeared in any official publication. Meanwhile the lobby of major polluters has managed to secure a number of profitable “flexibility” mechanisms. The first is the muchpublicised market in negotiable emissions permits, demanded by the United States on the pretence that its SO2experiment was successful, despite the difference in scale and the fact that the Kyoto Protocol is not based upon any shared regulatory framework. For the states that signed up to Annex B of the protocol (7), it is rather like the beginning of a game of Monopoly: each must allocate CO2emission rights to its most polluting installations (8). Governments do not, of course, stoop so low as to charge industry for these handouts, even though the resulting revenues would fund ambitious pro-environmental policies. These free allocations constitute a “right to pollute”, which assumes that the environment belongs by default to those who are damaging it. Once it has received its carbon credits a company has only to match Auréélien Bernier is the author of Les OGM en guerre contre la sociéété éand co-author,with Michel Gicquel,of Transgéénial!,both published by ATTAC/Mille et une nuits,Paris,2005 and 2006 respectively CORPORATES HUNT FOR PROFITSAST ?????? the quantity of CO2it actually emits with its quota. This is a simple accounting operation. Annual emissions represent a liability that must be balanced against the initial credit, which can be increased by purchases and reduced by sales. Signatories to the protocol can also exchange allocations by carrying out projects that economise on greenhouse gases: wind farms, methane capture, alternative fuels, tree planting etc. Under “joint implementation” (JI) one “host” country can, for example, plant trees and sell the resulting “emission reduction units” (ERUs) to another. Developing countries, led by Brazil, secured a concession whereby states that do not appear inAnnex B can also host such projects, in order to attract foreign capital. Since the host country has no commitment under the protocol, the resulting creation of “certified emissions reductions” (CERs) actually increases the amount of carbon currency circulating on the global market. The UN does not charge for CERs, and investors can either use them to meet their Kyoto commitments or sell them on the market like state-allocated quotas. These ingenious “clean development mechanisms” (CDMs) prevent any possible shortage of quotas; their supply can be increased as necessary. Parties can extend these mechanisms to sectors not covered by the allocation of quotas. In spring 2007 the French government established a regulatory framework for domestic projects, allowing private and public sector producers of low emissions to access the carbon market in return for investments that help reduce emissions or absorb CO2. The United Kingdom has gone even further and is currently drawing up legislation to give every adult a personal carbon allowance. This would be credited to a chip card, and the account would be debited every time the holder consumed primary energy – for example by filling up with petrol or settling an electricity bill. Once the account was exhausted, the user would have to pay to recharge the card or buy additional credits on the open market. The European carbon market, launched in 2005, is based on the financial markets. Trading can be conducted either directly, between allocation holders, or on formal CO2exchanges where transactions can be facilitated and secured. Since traders can conduct both cash and forward (9) transactions, carbon trades at two prices: the current “spot”
page 9
ASTHE CLIMATE CHANGE CRISIS BUILDS Le Monde diplomatique JANUARY 2008 9 price, and the forward price of a tonne delivered in December 2008. The spot price yo-yo’d between $30 and $45 a tonne, then collapsed in 2006 after the publication of the first statement of actual company emissions. These results showed how generous government quota allocations had been – hardly surprising since these had been based on industry forecasts. By September 2007 the spot price of CO2had collapsed to $0.07 per tonne, just enough to cover the cost of the transaction. Investments associated with the greenhouse effect are clearly driven by the desire to make a profit. A number of carbon funds have been established to manage portfolios of allocations, in particular those generated by CDMs. The World Bank is the leading manager of carbon shares (10). In France the deposit and consignment office (Caisse des déépôôts et consignations) is responsible for maintaining the national register of quotas and managing the European Carbon Fund, which it took the precaution of placing in a Luxemburg-based Sicav (investment fund with variable capital). It doesn’t take a genius to work out why CDMs are proving so popular. Equipment and labour costs mean that an investment of $120 is required to save a tonne of CO2in Europe, compared with just $5 in China (11). Unsurprisingly, companies in industrialised countries would rather go to China to invest in emissions-saving economic activities. Moreover, pouring public money into carbon funds allows states to offer secret aid to the companies that are the ultimate beneficiaries of the newly created quotas. Some analysts believe that between now and 2012 CDM projects could generate new quotas equivalent to the accumulated greenhouse gas emissions of Canada, France, Spain and Switzerland. In 2006 more than 40% of the global carbon market consisted of CERs (12), some of which had been improperly allocated to inappropriate projects. The beneficiaries were the countries that investors found most attractive. According to the World Bank, China and India hosted hundreds of projects and accounted for 73% of CERs. Africa hosted little more than 30 projects, with 80% of credits concentrated in three countries: South Africa, Egypt and Tunisia. This is a far cry from the pious talk in official publications of environmental protection, technology transfer and sustainable development. Apart from the cynicism of big companies, the general atmosphere on the markets associated with climate change is reminiscent of the internet boom. A vast speculative bubble is forming around processes that save CO2and generate valuable quotas. The French company Areva fought unsuccessfully for several months against the Indian group Suzlon to acquire the leading German wind turbine manufacture REpower, which at the beginning of April 2007 was worth 100 times its 2006 trading profit of $18m. The stockmarket flotation of Electricitéé de France’s environmental subsidiary succeeded beyond its wildest dreams: in less than 90 minutes shares put on 20% and the valuation at the end of the day had risen to six times turnover. When a series of scandals left another French company, Rhodia, on the verge of liquidation, it took a gamble on carbon. In 2005 it announced that it was spending $20m to renovate two factories, one in South Korea, the other in Brazil – a process that would yield 77m tonnes of carbon credits, worth $300m a year! The company’s shares leapt 14% in an hour. Business banks like Lehman Brothers and reinsurers like Swiss Re are starting to tempt investors into carbon finance (13). And this is just the beginning of a speculative process whose dangers are self-evident. International negotiations for the period after 2012 already look very alarming, with those involved apparently prepared to make any concession to bring the US on board. The American strategy could be to replace absolute emission reduction targets either with non-binding conditions or with goals expressed in “carbon intensity”, a measure of the CO2content of growth. In the latter case, the reference would be the amount of CO2emitted per point of GDP, which would make policies to combat climate change purely ornamental. Time is short and the warnings sounded by some ecologists do not encourage awareness. When Dominique Voynet, France’s former environment minister, suggests that “the mistake has been to believe that emissions trading was a liberal mechanism” (14), or when the Green MEP Alain Lipietz congratulates himself upon the system of negotiable permits (15), there is a danger of justifying the unjustifiable. Any effective solution involves questioning the systems of production and the rules of international trade, for example by introducing new customs duties on the energy and carbon content of imported products. Such a framework would be the opposite of protectionism, since revenues could be used to establish genuinely sustainable projects in developing countries. Such a mixed carbon/energy tax could also be applied to domestic industrial activity. In this case, half of receipts could go towards the national budget and support ambitious environmental public policies. The other half could be invested in helping individual businesses to reduce emissions. An effective package of public subsidies would complete the mechanism. In other words, we should respond to Coase and the environmental crisis by reinventing Pigou. TRANSLATED BY DONALD HOUNAM (1) Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, republished in two volumes, Cosimo, New York, 2006. (2) Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, Chicago, 1960. (3) Dennis L Meadows et al, The Limits to Growth, Universe Books, New York, 1972. An abstract can be downloaded from www.clubofrome.org/docs/limits.rtf (4) Olivier Godard, “L’expéérience amééricaine des permis néégociables”, Economie Internationale, CEPII, no 82, Paris, 2000. (5) Pierre Cornut, “Le carbon lobby et le Protocole de Kyoto”, Le Courrier de la Planèète, no 72, Montpellier, July 2004. (6) The difference between 5.2 and 4.8 is 0.4. An 0·4% reduction applied to 40% of emissions is 0.4 x (40 ÷100), which makes 0.16 of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions. (7) Annex B lists states that have made reduction commitments; it relates only to countries from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and east European countries in “transition to a market economy”. (8) The Kyoto Protocol targets six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Since CO2is the most significant contributor to the greenhouse effect it has been made the unit of reference, and emissions of the other five gases are expressed as CO2equivalents. (9) In a forward transaction, money does not actually change hands until some agreed future date, at an exchange rate agreed now. (10) At the end of July 2007 the World Bank was managing 11 carbon funds worth a total of $2.23bn. The average contribution of governments is about 50%. (11) See Annie Valléée, Economie de l’environnement, Seuil, Paris, 2002. (12) Karan Capoor, Philippe Ambrosi, “State and trends of the carbon market 2007”, World Bank, Washington DC, May 2007; http://carbonfinance.org/docs/Carbon_Trends_2007-_FINAL_-_May_2.pdf. The figure given relates to exchanges expressed in tonnes of CO2. (13) In 2007 Lehman Brothers (New York) published a report by John Llewellyn, “The business of climate change: Challenges and opportunities”. This was updated in September. See http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2007/TheBusinessOfClimateChange.pdf (14) See the round table “Climat, éénergies: et maintenant?”, http://www.courrierdelaplanete.org/72/article1.php (15) http://lipietz.net

8JANUARY 2008 Le Monde diplomatique

Should we scrap Kyoto? M ost scientists now agree that unless we limit greenhouse gas emissions,the planet could heat up by between 1.4oC and 5.8oC by the end of the century,with catastrophic consequences. Governments acknowledged the problem by signing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the second Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.Since then there have been regular negotiations at both international and national levels. Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,the international community accepted the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and agreed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Thirty industrialised nations signed up;developing countries took part in the negotiations but were exempted from specific reduction goals.Opposition from the planet’s leading polluter,the United States,which was required to reduce emissions by 7%,delayed the implementation of the protocol until February 2005.But 168 states have now ratified it – an indication of its importance. But as new economic powers like China and India emerge,energy use continues to increase.More than ever,looking beyond the Kyoto Protocol,the campaign to combat wastage,to increase energy efficiency and to replace fossil fuels with renewable resources is absolutely crucial. The first phase of the Kyoto Protocol is due to end soon,in 2012. The aim of December’s Bali conference was to set an agenda for negotiations on a global agreement on new methods of application to extend Kyoto beyond 2012.But contradictions remain.Developing countries from the Group of 77 have reminded the industrialised nations of their historic responsibility and want them to lead the way in cutting pollution.In September President George Bush organised a meeting of the world’s 17 leading polluters in Washington,at the end of which the US administration maintained its opposition to mandatory limits on carbon output.In a more positive development,China gave its support to the protocol as “the basis for any future international agreement on climate change”. Although it is inconceivable that there should be no agreement to cover the period after 2012,it would be stupid to regard Kyoto as the miracle solution. The protocol’s positive achievements are undermined by perverse effects.Some of its “flexible mechanisms” do nothing to help the structural reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.While defending Kyoto,we must also ask some very serious questions.

BY AURÉÉLIEN BERNIER The concept of environmental taxes dates back to 1920, when the British economist Arthur Cecil Pigou outlined the concept of “externality”: the impact upon an uninvolved party of any act of production or consumption (1). He described how hot cinders from steam locomotives could set fire to land alongside the railway tracks. Pigou suggested that a tax on such damage, imposed on the railway companies, would act as an incentive to stop cinders from escaping. This argument is the basis of the principle that the polluter should pay. Forty years later another British economist, Ronald Coase, insisted it would be better to leave the market to itself since state intervention would generate transaction costs (2). The best economic result would be obtained if the victims of trackside fires negotiated directly with the railway companies, which could resolve the problem by owning the adjacent land themselves. The Coase Theorem states that the assignment of rights is economically meaningless: it is unhelpful for the owner of the adjacent land to have a right not to be the victim of fires, or for the company to have the right to cause them. Nevertheless, in 1970 the US government responded to chronic atmospheric pollution by extending an earlier Clean Air Act to impose strict limits. Two years later the Club of Rome, a global think tank, published a report, “The Limits to Growth” (3), that warned of a catastrophic future if the human race failed to take account of the environmental dimension. A correlation was suggested between the concentration of CO2in the atmosphere and climate change; discussions on the greenhouse effect became increasingly common. But when US industry failed to respect the Clean Air Act, the government reacted by weakening the act’s provisions. In 1990 it introduced a system of emissions trading that fixed targets for reducing the sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions that are responsible for acid rain. This initially awarded 110 heavy polluters permits to emit SO2, then allowed them to trade these rights on a free market. The hope was that improvements would occur first where the investment costs involved were lowest, and that the surplus authorisations thus generated would be sold to plants emitting more pollution than they had been allocated. Heavy fines would be imposed upon any company whose actual SO2emissions exceeded its annual allocation. This system apparently respected Coase’s prescriptions by letting the market operate freely. The Acid Rain programme was successful: the target of a 40% reduction in SO2emissions compared with 1980 was met and even exceeded. But this dramatic fall was largely due to the fact that many polluters cleaned up their act in anticipation of ongoing regulation and limits, and that the coal industry developed competitive low-sulphur products. The impact of market trading was marginal (4). Anyway, there were serious secondary consequences: because the new coal generated less heat, more had to be burned, which inevitably increased emissions of another pollutant, CO2. But disciples of state non-intervention drew a single conclusion: the market in quotas had worked and must therefore be extended. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up in 1988 to warn of the consequences of global warming. In 1992 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was presented for ratification, and was welcomed by most countries. Its stated objective was “to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere”. But it failed to set out specific targets or how they should be achieved. Instead it provided for subsequent updates: the most important was the Kyoto Protocol for which negotiations began in December 1997. Since the UN’s framework required unanimity, the battle between industrialised and developing countries was fierce. It was four years before the legal framework was settled by the Marrakesh accords of November 2001. The US withdrew from Kyoto after the Senate voted unanimously against ratification. This limited the protocol’s scope to 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions. So the commitment to reduce emissions to 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2012 actually represents only a 2% reduction overall. Taking into account the fact that, at the time of the negotiations, emissions had alreadyfallen by 4.8% compared with 1990 (5), the real target falls to a reduction of 0.16% in the quantity of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere (6)! This figure is so pathetic, given the stakes, that has it never appeared in any official publication. Meanwhile the lobby of major polluters has managed to secure a number of profitable “flexibility” mechanisms. The first is the muchpublicised market in negotiable emissions permits, demanded by the United States on the pretence that its SO2experiment was successful, despite the difference in scale and the fact that the Kyoto Protocol is not based upon any shared regulatory framework. For the states that signed up to Annex B of the protocol (7), it is rather like the beginning of a game of Monopoly: each must allocate CO2emission rights to its most polluting installations (8). Governments do not, of course, stoop so low as to charge industry for these handouts, even though the resulting revenues would fund ambitious pro-environmental policies. These free allocations constitute a “right to pollute”, which assumes that the environment belongs by default to those who are damaging it. Once it has received its carbon credits a company has only to match

Auréélien Bernier is the author of Les OGM en guerre contre la sociéété éand co-author,with Michel Gicquel,of Transgéénial!,both published by ATTAC/Mille et une nuits,Paris,2005 and 2006 respectively

CORPORATES HUNT FOR PROFITSAST

??????

the quantity of CO2it actually emits with its quota. This is a simple accounting operation. Annual emissions represent a liability that must be balanced against the initial credit, which can be increased by purchases and reduced by sales. Signatories to the protocol can also exchange allocations by carrying out projects that economise on greenhouse gases: wind farms, methane capture, alternative fuels, tree planting etc. Under “joint implementation” (JI) one “host” country can, for example, plant trees and sell the resulting “emission reduction units” (ERUs) to another. Developing countries, led by Brazil, secured a concession whereby states that do not appear inAnnex B can also host such projects, in order to attract foreign capital. Since the host country has no commitment under the protocol, the resulting creation of “certified emissions reductions” (CERs) actually increases the amount of carbon currency circulating on the global market. The UN does not charge for CERs, and investors can either use them to meet their Kyoto commitments or sell them on the market like state-allocated quotas. These ingenious “clean development mechanisms” (CDMs) prevent any possible shortage of quotas; their supply can be increased as necessary. Parties can extend these mechanisms to sectors not covered by the allocation of quotas. In spring 2007 the French government established a regulatory framework for domestic projects, allowing private and public sector producers of low emissions to access the carbon market in return for investments that help reduce emissions or absorb CO2. The United Kingdom has gone even further and is currently drawing up legislation to give every adult a personal carbon allowance. This would be credited to a chip card, and the account would be debited every time the holder consumed primary energy – for example by filling up with petrol or settling an electricity bill. Once the account was exhausted, the user would have to pay to recharge the card or buy additional credits on the open market. The European carbon market, launched in 2005, is based on the financial markets. Trading can be conducted either directly, between allocation holders, or on formal CO2exchanges where transactions can be facilitated and secured. Since traders can conduct both cash and forward (9) transactions, carbon trades at two prices: the current “spot”

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