h i s t o r y
When Germany attacked Russia in 1941, Churchill refused to withdraw any of his denunciations of the communist leadership, but he did famously remark, ‘If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.’ His wartime association with Stalin was a strange, contradictory affair: Churchill the romantic liked to see it as a heroic partnership of anti-fascist crusaders; Churchill the pragmatist knew he was allied with a bloodstained tyrant. When, towards the end of the war, Stalin’s tyranny was made hideously manifest in Poland, the freedom of which Britain was in theory fighting for, Churchill contemplated Operation Unthinkable.
This was a revitalised version of his former ambition to kill the Bolshie and kiss the Hun. Yet Jonathan Walker, who has now produced the first full-scale study of the 1945 proposal, says nothing about its post-Great War predecessor. This is a pity because it illustrates the fact that Churchill was tenacious as well as impulsive, wedded to long-held ideas yet the champion of daring improvisation. His willingness to commission a feasibility study of a new conflict before the current one had finished also needs to be seen in a wider and still more paradoxical context. Churchill found war irresistibly ‘delicious’ while acknowledging its unbearable barbarism. Moreover, the cold warrior of the ‘iron curtain’ speech of 1946 was the prime mover of détente with the Soviet Union during the early 1950s – he even had to answer charges of appeasing Stalin.
If Walker is thin on the big picture, he uses original documents to excellent effect in his detailed portrayal of Operation Unthinkable itself. Reporting to Churchill on 24 May 1945, just over a fortnight after Germany surrendered, the Joint Planning Staff confirmed his view that it comprised ‘the whole machinery of negation’. Admittedly the planners reckoned that in any conflict with the Soviet Union Britain would have air and naval superiority. But they concluded that the battle-hardened Red Army would enjoy a decisive advantage on the ground, fielding twice as much armour and four times as many troops. Even if the British mounted a surprise attack, reinforced
Lure of the Arcane The Literature of Cult and Conspiracy Theodore Ziolkowski Fascination with the arcane is a driving force in this comprehensive survey of conspiracy fiction. Ziolkowski traces the evolution of cults, orders, lodges, secret societies, and conspiracies through various literary manifestations— drama, romance, epic, novel, opera—from Euripides’s Bacchae to Umberto Eco to the thrillers of the twenty-first century.
£26.00 cloth • £26.00 ebook
Distributed by John Wiley • Tel: 01243 843291 • press.jhu.edu by remnants of the defeated Wehrmacht, it was likely to meet the fate of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa.
The odds would be quite overwhelming without American support, said the planning staff, and it was obvious that this would be withheld. Harry Truman was not told about Unthinkable (though Stalin probably knew about it thanks to his spies), but he shared Roosevelt’s suspicion that Churchill would fight to the last GI in defence of the British Empire. In any case the new president wanted peace, even if it meant conniving at Russia’s rape of Poland. The dominions, especially Australia, would almost certainly have agreed. So would the British public, recently exposed to the horrors of Belsen and long fed on propaganda about the heroism of its Soviet ally – Clementine Churchill was on a goodwill tour of Russia even as Operation Unthinkable was being conceived. No wonder Field Marshal Alan Brooke, chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, dismissed it as ‘fantastic and … unthinkable!’
In response to this opposition Churchill carried out an abrupt volte-face. He now demanded a plan to defend Britain against a Soviet Union that would have the power, after American withdrawal from Europe, to advance to the North Sea and the Atlantic. But the code name Unthinkable should be kept to indicate that it remained ‘a precautionary study of what, I hope, is still a purely hypothetical contingency’. It became less hypothetical in July 1945 when the atomic bomb was successfully tested. This more than compensated for the might of the Red Army, as Churchill was quick to appreciate. If the Soviets misbehaved ‘we could just blot out Moscow, then Stalingrad, then Kiev,’ he remarked jubilantly. ‘And now where are the Russians!!!!’
Mercifully Churchill had no opportunity to exercise such nuclear blackmail and when the Soviet Union got the bomb in 1949 he settled for a balance of terror. Three years before that, however, America developed its own edition of Unthinkable, a plan for a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union with conventional weapons codenamed Operation Pincher. It too proved abortive and the Third World War was postponed – for the nonce. To order this book for £13.59, see the Literary Review Bookshop on page 38
Literary Review | d e c e m b e r 2 0 1 3 / j a n u a r y 2 0 1 4 8