any serious military adventures against their powerful neighbour.
There remains Rhodesia. Here the African nationalist movement, as in South Africa itself, is hopelessly split, a factor which minimises its political impact enormously. It seems highly unlikely, for reasons discussed in a note elsewhere in this issue, that Rhodesia can be deflected from its present course by sanctions, and even if it were, we have to face the fact that generally African nationalists governments are marked not so much for their revolutionary ardour, or even their radicalism, as their conservatism in clinging to colonial-inspired and western orientated economic institutions which are commonly the bulwark of their own political survival.
So that those who look to the remote prospect of an African Nationalist Government in Salisbury as an instrument of black liberation further south would do well to make a sober appraisal of the policies of those African states which have already achieved independence: (They would do well too to digest the implications of the fact that exports last year from South Africa to the rest of Africa totalled approximately £30 million and that this, according to one source, represented a 30 per cent. rise over the previous year.) The border state of Zambia may be an exception in its policies either way, but the closest comparison is doubtless Kenya, where a large white farming population also existed. (It is said that after World War II Kenya was largely settled by unemployed ex-officers, whilst the N.C.0.'s and privates went to Rhodesia). The Kenya Government's record gives little grounds for encouragement, neither does that of Dr. Hastings Banda's or Dr. Milton Obote's. Without extending the list further the lesson is clear. In the absence of a strong military help any future black government in Salisbury will do nothing to promote discord with its powerful southern neighbour if such a policy is likely to jeopardise its own existence. It will indeed pursue a reverse policy if it enables it to avoid this latter contingency as Seretze Khama is doing in neighbouring Botswana (formerly Bechuanaland). There remains the United Nations Organisation. This body will only act militarily against South Africa if a significant majority of its members agree to finance such an action. Neither of these conditions looks remotely like being fulfilled.
What prospect of deliverance then remains for the millions of Africans who labour under this political tyranny, a tyranny compounded by a racial prejudice of quite groteque proportions ? In immediate terms it is clear there are none at all, whilst in terms measured in generations the most that can be anticipated is a steady undermining of the morale of the white population and the slow decay of their political institutions. If this should occur, and there seems to be an even chance it will, there will then be a prospect that a nascent African nationalist movement will be able to engage the rivalries that may emerge among the whites for its own purposes.
profound corruption Such a development would not proceed without a profound corruption of the aims of the nationalist movement (how indeed could it work otherwise ? ) and it is politically naive to suppose that a prolonged process of decay and confusion among the whites would leave the African nationalist movement itself unaffiicted by the same kind of consequences.
In the light of this brief survey of their exceedingly bleak prospects it seems evident that the possibilities
of securing a change and liberalisation of government for the black people of South Africa by using violent means have no immediate prospects at all of success Yet a solution based on violence, on armed fighting, is the only policy now being advocated by the African Nationalists. This phase of the struggle began with the emergence of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1960 as a breakaway movement from the much older African National Congress (ANC). PAC's main charge against its rivals was that it was dominated by communist influence and that its policy of constitutional methods to secure constitutional advance lacked both realism and results. There is probably some substance in the first charge, although it may be less than PAC is prone to assert, but the second is surely unanswerable. After three generations of increasingly militant struggle the prospect of liberation is as remote as ever, and tyranny is now more securely clamped on luckless African shoulders than at any previous time. Yet what is PAC's answer to the charges it makes ? Clearly since it receives aid from foreign sources itself, notably from the UAR, it is not averse to obtaining outside help, nor is it easy to imagine it refusing offers of help if they came (as doubtless they do) from communist sources. But what has PAC to say on its main charge of effectuality, and how does it expect to achieve better results than its rivals ?
In its early days PAC undoubtedly made a considerable impact on the African people and its following was large and enthusiastic. By early 1963 its leaders were publicly announcing plans for a mass uprising in April. These plans, which would almost certainly have brought a wholesale butchering of black people by white, and which would have had no other result than the intensification of white tyranny, collapsed when a courier of Potlako Leballo's was arrested on her way from the Basutoland headquarters of PAC and the extensive list of contacts she carried fell into the hands of the South African police. Since that time both PAC and ANC have made vigorous attempts to assert their primacy as the leaders of the liberation struggle, but it is almost impossible to say who is really leading. What matters is that PAC now advocates a policy of violence and the ANC finds itself compelled to follow along with statements such as "we have never ruled out the use of violence ". PAC has now gone further, it has opted for "Azania " to replace • Union of South Africa ' as the name of the country and this is a highly charged decision, for the word itself is reputed to mean 'country of black people'. Such a decision, which is racialist to its core, having regard to the fact that much of the Cape provinces were inhabited by Bushmen and Hottentots fleeing from invading Zulu tribes from the North when the first settlers arrived at the Cape, (white and black then operated independently to exterminate the Bushmen and the Hottentots), is tantamount to denying the historical validity of three centuries of white settlement in the area, and such a denial can only maintain and even strengthen the present inflexibility of white attitudes. This is not a policy, it is simply a surrender by PAC to emotionally charged forces of unreason and the only foreseeable consequences it can have is to worsen the African plight.
What then is the alternative ? It is a good axiom even for pacifist radicals not to confront opponents where they are strongest, and to tackle them instead