definitions. Much depends on geography and local circumstances. _ A few thou~and people, no doubt, would be too few to constitute a "district" for economic development. But a community of a few hundred thousand people, even if fairly widely scattered, may well deserve to be treated as a development district. The whole of Switzerland has less than six million inhabitants; yet it is divided into more than. twenty "cantons", and each "canton" is a kind of development district, with the result that the tendency towards the formation of vast industrial concentrations is minimised. Each "district", ideally speaking, would have some sort of inner cohesion and identity and possess at least one town to serve as the district centre • . While every village would have a primary school, there would be a few small market towns with secondary schools, and the district centre would be big enough to carry an institution of higher learning. There is need for a "cultural structure", just as there is need for an "economic structure" within any country, be it even as small as Switzerland. This need for internal "structures" is of course particularly urgent in large countries, such as India. Unless every district of India is made the object of development efforts, so to say: for its own sake and in its own right, all development will concentrate in a few places with devastating results for the country as a whole. It is obvious that this "regional" or "district" approach has no chance of success unless it is based on the employment of suitable technology. We have already alluded to the disruptive forces, stemming from modern technology, which are making themselves felt even in the most highly industrialised countries today. The trend to "megalopolis" noticeable all over the world, is simply the effect of modern technology, in transport as well as in industrial production, which lives under the law of "nothing succeeds like success". Unfortunately, the inevitable concomitant of this law is its opposite: "Nothing fails like failure", and this gives rise to the twin evils of unemployment and mass migration in the "developing" countries. The only chance of counteracting these baneful laws would seem to be the conscious development of an "intermediate technology". Here again, it is not possible to arrive at any simple and clear-cut definition. "Intermediate technology" must be appropriate to the country in question. It is surely an astonishing error to assume that the technology developed in the West is necessarily appropriate to the "developing" countries. Granted that their technological ba(;'.kwardness is an important reason for their poverty; granted, too, that their traditional methods of production, in their present condition of decay, lack essential viability: it by no means follows that the technology of the richest countries is necessarily suitable for the advancement of the poor. It must never be forgotten that modern technology is the product of count~ies which are "long" in capital and "short" in labour, and that its main purpose, abundantly demonstrated by
the trend towards automation, is to substitute machines for men. How could this technology fit the conditions of countries which suffer from a surplus of labour and a shortage of machines?
CHEAPER BUT BETTER
If we define the level of technology in terms of "equipment cost per yvork-place", we can call the indigenous technology of a typical "developing" country (symbolically ·speaking) a £1-technology, while that of the modem West could be called a · £1,000-technology. The current attempt of the "developing" countries, supported by foreign aid, to infiltrate the £1,000-technology into their economies inevitably kills off the £1-technology at an alarming rate, destroying traditional workplaces at a much faster rate than modern workplaces can be created and producing the "dual economy" with its attendant evils of mass unemployment and mass migration. The gap between these two technologies is so enormous that a tolerably smooth transition from the one to the other is simply impossible, even if it were desirable. It is obvious that the high average income of the developed countried derives primarily from the high level of capitalisation of the avergae workplace. But the development planners appear to overlook the equally obvious fact that such a high level of capital per workplace itself presupposes the existence of a high level of income. "Income per man" and "capital per workplace" stand in an organic relationship to each other, a relationship that can be "stretched" to some extent - for instance with the help of foreign aid - but cannot be disregarded. The average annual income per worker and the average capital per workplace in the developed countries appear to stand in a relationship of roughly 1: 1. This implies in general terms, that it takes one man-year to create one workplace, or that a man would have to save one month's earnings a year for twelve years to be able to buy his own workplace, If the relationship were 1 : 10, it would require ten man-years to create one workplace, and a man would have to.save a month's earnings a year for 120years, before he could make himself independent. This, of course, is an impossibility, and it follows that the £1,000-technology transplanted into a country the bulk of which is stuck on the level of a £1-technology simply cannot spread by any process of normal growth. It cannot have a positive "demonstration effect"; on the contrary - as can be observed all over the world - its "demonstration effect" is wholly negative. The vast majority of people, to whom the £1,000-technology is totally inaccessible, simply "give up", while there_ remain small "islands" of an alien world, which can in no way blend into the economy as a whole, and the extra income generated by these "islands" is immediately absorbed by the cost arising from mass migration. It is of course admitted that there are certain sectors and localities in every "developing" country which are irrevocably committed to the employment of the