TH E D A TA OF ETHICS."

A SUMMARY OF HERBERT SPENCER’S WORK.

S U P P L E M E N T TO “ T H E L I T E R A R Y G U ID E , " M A R CH , 1897.

In the full acceptation o f the term, conduct must he taken as comprehending all adjustments of acts to ends from the simplest to the most complex. There is a large part o f conduct which has in itself no ethical significance but is constantly tending, in proportion as it affects welfare’ to pass into moral or immoral relations. “ Fully to understand human conduct as a whole, we must study it as a part o f that larger whole constituted by the conduct Of animate beings in general.” And to understand existing phenomena we must regard them as an outcome o f the influences which have brought life to its present height— that is, we must study

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT.

Inquiries o f this nature should begin at the beginning and accordingly we find that living organisms manifen activities which, in proportion to their number and varied secure the continuance o f the individual life and conse quently the general end o f the continuance o f the suedes' The lowest organisms possess such limited functions that they fail to prolong existence beyond a few brief ho r The mammal adjusts its actions to ends in a way which secures the balance of organic activity thr„,,„u . periods. The distinction between acts which are, and actf which are not, directed to a definite purpose arises bv degrees. The adjustments by mankind of acts to ends are more complete than among lower mammals, and we find the sa thing on comparing the doings o f higher races of men with those o f lower races. In the mere elementary needs e f nr in food, in warmth, in dwellings, a great superiority exists on the part o f civilized races. And when the many activities o f commercial, social, and political life are into account, the contrast is greatly strengthened 60

In the animal world the adjustment o f acts to end 1 one creature almost invariably means failure to make tW adjustment on the part o f others. Many sheeD and Am i die that the tiger may live. Failure to complete the perfect individual adjustment is constantly found in human soc but it is always tending to a state wherein each individual hfe may be perfected without hindering others from doing likewise. I he evolution o f conduct can be completed on y in permanently peaceful societies.

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GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT.

In speaking of inanimate objects, we call them good or bad, according as they are well or ill adapted to achieve their particular ends. The same principle applies to human conduct. The beneficial tendency o f acts which further self-preservation needs little enforcement. Acts which promote the well-being o f others are of a more highly evolved character and require greater insistence. The words “ good’’ and “ bad” have come to be specially associated with acts which further or obstruct the complete living of others ; but the evolution o f conduct is ever tending to make the two sets of actions less divergent by promoting the conditions which facilitate the growth of higher obligations. The conduct called good rises to the conduct conceived as best when it fulfils both classes of ends at the same time.

IS LIFE WORTH LIVING?

At the bottom of our estimates of conduct lies the question whether life is worth living. I f it is not, actions which tend to prolong it should be blamed ; those which abridge it, approved. Both these opposing views agree in assessing the worth o f life according to the pleasure it brings, and if we call good that which subserves life, we imply that life is desirable. If we analyze the various meanings of the word “ good,” we shall find that good conduct is invariably that which brings a surplus of pleasurable feeling. I f the effects of actions were reversed, if picking pockets caused pleasure, and attending the sick increased the pains of illness, we could not possibly use the terms good and bad in their present sense. The conception of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happiness-producing conduct. It is because the virtues conduce to happiness that they come to be classed as virtues. To allege that the distinction is derived from the will of God fails to give any real explanation. “ It must be either admitted or denied that the acts called good and the acts called bad naturally conduce the one to human well-being, and the other to human ill-being. Is it admitted ? Then the admission amounts to an assertion that the conduciveness is shown by experience ; and this involves abandonment of the doctrine that there is no origin for morals apart from divine injunctions. Is it denied that acts classed as good and bad differ in their effects ? Then it is tacitly affirmed that human affairs would go on just as well in ignorance of the distinction ; and the alleged need for commandments from God disappears.”

CAUSATION.

Moral and social phenomena are, from their complexity, the last in which the idea of causation is perceived. Yet there is a cause for the distinction between right and wrong — a cause which does not lie in divine injunctions, for that view amounts to a confession that a given action does not produce its natural results ; nor in State enactments, for men are capable of doing right without compulsion, and the acts of a governing body have no other warrant than their subservience to the purpose for which it came into existence. Conduct cannot be made good or bad by law ; it is the furtherance, or otherwise, of the lives of the citizens which gives to conduct its moral quality. Law recognizes, but does not create, the intrinsic tendencies of acts to produce beneficial or mischievous results. It is from these natural effects that legislation derives its authority; and to affirm that we know right from wrong only by means of a supernaturally-given conscience is tacitly to deny the relation between cause and effect— a relation which exists throughout the whole of human conduct. Even the utilitarian school of moralists do not sufficiently recognize the principle of causation, since they judge conduct too exclusively by immediate results, and neglect the principle that wrongful acts have an inevitable tendency to lower the life of the individual ns well as the life of society at large. Moral science should ascertain the necessary relations between causes and effects, and from them deduce rules of conduct available for future guidance.

Ethics, then, dealing with the conduct of associated human beings, becomes a science in proportion as its phenomena are shown to be consequences of ultimate principles. Its connection with more specific sciences gives it a physical aspect, a biological aspect, a psychological aspect, and a sociological aspect. It must, therefore, find its interpretation in those fundamental truths which are common to all these branches of knowledge.

THE PHYSICAL VIEW.

We are so accustomed to look at motives that we forget the physical side of conduct, made up of movements of the body and limbs, and recognized by touch, sight, and hearing. The elements of conduct which we exclusively think of as constituting it are not known, but inferred. There is a vague sameness about the actions of the lower organisms which is transformed into greater variety in proportion as we ascend the scale of evolution. The actions of a savage evince a vastly greater degree of unity and purpose than those of the most intelligent animals. In civilized life coherence of conduct is increased to an almost