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AND RATIONALIST REVIEW .

[ESTABLISHED 1883.]

No. 19. (New Series.)

JANUARY i , 1898.

Monthly ; Twopence.

C o n t e n t s .

THE Parting of the Ways. By Charles E. Hooper . 1 The Work of Rationalism. By R. Bithell . . 2 The Present Position of the Bible. By F. J.

Gould ...... ^ The Non-Religion of the Future . . .4 The Greatest of Sciences . . . ^ Schopenhauer . . . . . 6 A Library of Great T houghts . . ^ Signs and Warnings (Gleaned from the Reli­

gious Press)...... 7 Random Jottings . . . . . . 8 Literary Chats. X.—With Dr. W. R. Washington

Sullivan. By F. J. G. . . . .

In Memory of George Julian Harney . . Rationalism in the Magazines . . . I2 Short Notices . . . . .

P A G E

9

£ b c parttno of tbe M a p s . Since the term Rationalism is very apt to be misunderstood, while the reality— the intellectual movement— known as Rationalism is peculiarly liable to be misrepresented by bigoted opponents, we propose to indicate, in brief o u t l in e , how clear and strenuous an account of itself Rationalism can actually give. Men who measure the truth of opinions by their popularity, and the vitality o f movem ents by their present influence, would doubtless c l o t h e standpoint of Rationalism that is, of rationalist conviction, not merely o f the vague rationalistic spirit which does already dominate the world—-an extreme position. They would class our doctrine with those many quixotic, chimerical, or vicious theories which err from missing thè philosophic mean of judgment. Would they be right ?

ascertained truths of science, and it is well, indeed, if the progressive sections of either party find that their views as to the practical duties and present ends of life are really converging towards the same human-catholic lines. But these considerations do not affect the fundamental divergence between the schools. There is a logical, a cosmical, a working theory on either hand. Yonder towers the Old. Here springs the New. The intervening gap— the dim transition between the Ages— is filled with platitudes, hypocrisies, inconsistencies, and ineffectualities.

Tliere'is, in the first place, a difference of opinion as to the right method of reaching conviction. The nonRationalist, no matter whether he be of the more orthodox or the more liberal type, accepts various theories, such as those of the Bible’s inspiration, Christ’s divinity, God’s personality, the soul’s separability from the body, as in some sense certain. He may confess that they are only certain to faith, or he may profess to have rational grounds for believing them, and may even interpret them in a rationalistic sense of his own conceiving; but in no case will he allow them to be seriously questioned, and if, at times, he cannot help half doubting them, he regards himself as one tempted, or decadent, or morally delinquent. The Rationalist, on the other hand, no matter whether he feels himself entitled to deny these theories categorically (on the ground that theyoriginate in mythical traditions or metaphysical fallacies), or only to doubt them permanently (on the ground that we can have no real knowledge of things unrelated to experience), is, in either case, equally confident that they are not certain; and although a convinced Rationalist may have felt keen pangs in relinquishing the prepossessions of his former faith, he thinks that he was perfectly right to relinquish them ; that he would have been wholly wrong in stifling his doubts, had it been possible to do so. Here, then, are two diametrically opposed frames of mind, resulting in two groups of statements which are logically contradictory, if not also logically “ contrary.” On the one hand, it is maintained that so-and-so is absolutely certain ; on the other, that it is utterly uncertain.

A philosophic mean may lie either between two confused opinions or between two sets of opinions neither o f which is self-consistent. Suppose A to maintain that “ we know nothing which is not experience,” and B that “ we know nothing which is not thought.” Their views seem hopelessly irreconcilable ; but presently C comes along and propounds the amendment : “ We know nothing which is not both given in experience and cognized by thought.” We are not here concerned with the abstract correctness of C ’s statement, but, supposing it to be correct, it is evident that he has found the philosophic mean between A ’s extreme and B ’s extreme position. Again, we may suppose A to hold twelve opinions the general purport of which seems utterly opposed to the general purport of twelve opinions held by B. But now C puts in an appearance, and shows that six of A ’s opinions are, though differently worded, practically identical with six of B ’s, and that these six may be taken as true, while A and B must each consent to throw away six opinions as worthless. There again would be an instance of the philosophic mean. When, on the other hand, any single point at issue can be clearly stated, the truth inevitably lies at one or other extreme of a logical contradiction, and no philosophic mean is possible. Now, we propose to show that the main points at issue between Rationalists and non-Rationalists are susceptible of perfectly clear statement, and that therefore it behoves every logical thinker to range himself on one or other side in the great controversy. We certainly do not wish to exaggerate differences of opinion : it is a good thing that educated people, whether Rationalists or non-Rationalists, are now able to agree as to numberless

When we forsake the subjective for the objective— reason for nature— the issue is less clearly defined, and perhaps ought not to be made a test of Rationalism, as such. Yet here the general opposition of Rationalism to nonRationalism is equally real. For the typical modern Rationalist, science, or, strictly speaking, philosophy, which connects science into a fairly coherent whole, is a veritable revelation. Under its influence there grows within him a grand conception of interlinking, self-sufficing Nature ; and whatever materialistic, idealistic, or other turn the conception may take, he is perfectly satisfied that this stupendous, pervading Reality can no more be figured as, or surmounted by, a Deity possessed of sublimated human intelligence than byaYahveh who could take bodily exercise in the Garden of Eden.

On descending from the sphere of pure nature to the circumstantial plane of history, the Rationalist still stands in definite opposition to the non-Rationalist. The nonRationalist has not really recovered from the still present effects of the old arbitrary division of history into sacred and profane; the latter half made to fit nature, the former to fit supernature. He may reject almost all, or may accept almost all, the conclusions of the higher criticism as applied to the Bible ; but he will not, even in the latter case, admit that the residuum of “ inspiration ” is simply the inspiration of men who were, in their way, ethical geniuses. The Rationalist, on the other hand,’ , welcomes Biblical criticism as the great confirmation of