THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS. A SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUDING SECTIONS OF MR. HERBERT SPENCERS “ PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS.”

S U P P L E M E N T TO “ T H E L I T E R A R Y G U I D E " A P R I L , 1898.

I n a former Supplement to the Literary Guide an account was given of the ideas embodied in the first portion of Mr Herbert Spencer’s Principles o f Ethics. It is proposed in the present paper to give a similarly condensed statement of the remainder of the first volume of that remarkable work. There Mr. Spencer examines the facts which form the basis of man’s ethical knowledge, their number and variety making this part of the work more interesting' to the general reader than the philosophical analysis of the Data of Ethics. A rapid glance at each chapter will afford the clearest view of the line of argument.

THE CONFUSION OF ETHICAL THOUGHT. So various are the notions of right and wrong that ethics cannot be made clear and distinct until a high stage of mental evolution is reached. Thought on this subject is still in a confused state. The religions of savage tribes for the most part, put moral commands on a basis which has nothing to do with ethics. Certain actions are supposed to be pleasing, certain others displeasing, to their gods ; and obedience to these arbitrary notions becomes the prevailing moral standard. Among the Hebrews similar ideas existed : sin was regarded as disobedience to divine law s; the will of God was the source of morality And, in spite of the perception that some actions have a thoroughly natural sanction, in consequence of their inevitable tendency to produce certain effects, the belief still lingers in the most advanced communities that moral obligation is supernaturally derived.

A further cause of confusion is seen in the existence particularly in civilized countries under the sway of Christianity, of two conflicting moral standards—one which requires obedience to the spirit of goodwill, the other requiring obedience to the spirit of hatred. The former which may be called the ethics of amity, is the nominal rule of life; the latter, the ethics of enmitv, is, in manv cases, the more powerful incentive to action. The enormous armies of the present time illustrate the stronger claim of the warlike over the peaceful spirit in countries ostensibly governed by the rules of Christianity. Communities that have had to co-operate for external defence come to perceive that the friendship of the members is essential to vigorous opposition to an external foe. Where the religion of the community has arisen from within, the obligations of internal union and of resistance to an enemy proceed, or are supposed to proceed, from the same source, and to have the same sanction ; hence the two obligations are not perceived to be in opposition. Where a religion has been adopted from without, which religion lays stress on the obligation of amity, and forbids all obligation to enmity, some confusion if not conflict, between the two claims of necessity arises. ’

WHAT IDEAS AND SENTIMENTS ARE ETHICAL. Can any ethics of enmity exist? The very question shows that there is a class of actions not openly recognised as ethical, which yet are often followed in preference to those actions which are so recognised. Undoubtedly man forms certain ideas of what acts are right and what wrong in warfare, and such acts cannot be excluded from consideration, as no part of ethics. The duelling code of the Continent compels a man to fight under certain circumstances or be branded with disgrace. Obligations imposed bv custom, and not by any real ethical promptings,are sometimes very strong. Among certain Mohammedan tribes and some Russian sects smoking is looked upon as an unpardonable sin. According to Livingstone, among the Makololo even the women considered that it was not “ respectable ” for a man to have one wife only. The difference between the moral ideas of the civilized man and those of savages is strikingly illustrated by the belief which existed in Fiji that a man’s most sacred duty to his parents was to bury them alive! In numbers of cases customs form the basis of social and religious laws ; they embody the rule of the dead over the living. The feeling of “ought” becomes associated with legal commands, because the strength of custom lies at the back of them ; and in time a general consciousness arises that obedience to law, as such, is right, and disobedience wrong. Even where law infringes natural rights, so powerful is the artificial sanction that disregard of it is considered blameworthy. The general idea of “ ought ” becomes closely associated with obedience to law ; and the idea of obedience carries with it the conception of some coercive power—whether it be physical force or the dictates of conscience. The opinion of others, also, is so great a factor of the ethical consciousness that the thought of it will sometimes cause more shame for an action which, though good, is unconventional than for an action intrinsically bad. How many gentlemen would wheel home the barrow of a lame costermonger? The true ethical sentiment, however, acts independently of external authority, since it is concerned with those conditions which naturally and permanently tend to promote happiness and avoid misery. Merely conventional rules of morality afford a body of thought and feeling which may be called pro-ethical. This, with the majority of persons, stands in place of the real ethical sentiment; and most of the facts dealt with in the present section are illustrations of this pro-ethical feeling.

AGGRESSION.

Many acts resulting in bodily injury and death to others are prompted by this pro-ethical sentiment, by a motive not wicked in itself, but arising from a vague idea of necessity, or benefit. Thus infanticide sprang from the fear that too many mouths would require to be fe d ; human sacrifices from the belief that the dead chief required attendants, or the gods victims to appease their hunger or wrath. To these must be added the slaughters by which, in comparatively modern times, both Catholics and Protestants hoped to appease the imaginary anger of their God against misbelievers. Ideas of this nature result in so little sanctity being attached to human life that murder becomes almost the only fine art in which some tribes are proficient. A Bushman, who had boasted of killing women and children, being asked by Livingstone what God would say to him, replied: “ He will say that I was a very clever fellow.” The civilizations of Europe, in their earlier stages, displayed a similar ferocity; and the sentiment which is ready without just cause to slaughter assumed enemies is still alive and strong.

Against these ethics of enmity we have to set the rise of the ethics of amity. Long before the Christian era we find in the writings of the Eastern moralists condemnation of the practice of slaughter, and injunctions to treat others as we would ourselves be treated. The Persian poet Saadi said, “ Show kindness even to thy foes”; and Mencius declared that death was not punishment enough for such a crime as needless war. It is strange to find that some unsophisticated children of nature really are of peaceful disposition. Certain tribes of India and Sumatra are mild and gentle in their habits. The great object of the Iroquois League was to break up the spirit of perpetual warfare, which the North American Indians had from age to age exhibited; and under the Iroquois social system crimes were rare. The altruistic sentiment of love to one’s neighbour was manifested among the Hebrews, and in later times carried to extremes.

As a general principle, the evidence shows that where antagonism between tribes has been constant the ethics of enmity predominate, and consequently repress the ethics of amity proper to the internal life of a community. In developing Europe wars between towns were common; violence, cruelty, murder, almost everywhere prevailed. With the consolidation of kingdoms, and the growth of industry, which necessitate co-operation, aggression was