Xttetar^ (Buibe
AND RATIONALIST REVIEW.
[ESTABLISHED 1885.]
No. 23. (New Series.)
M AY 1, 1898.
M o n t h l y ; T w o p en c e ,
Contents.
Rival V iews of Advancement. By Charles E
Hooper . >. The Point of V iew. By C. T. Gorham “ Young Man, I say unto Thee, Ar is e !” Mr. Robert Buchanan and the Gospel of
Humanity Pictures of Mediaeval Arabia The Words of an Ethical Believer The Berkelevan Philosophy “ T o Himself” Natural and Supernatural “ Lara’s” New Romance. Signs and Warnings Random Jottings . Literary Shrines and Pilgrimages. IV.—
Grave at Edmonton. By Amos Waters New F rench Books Rationalism in the Magazines
Lamb’s
65 66 66 67 68 69 69 70 70 71 71 72
73 75 75
amuses the now dominant party of reaction, and seems to strengthen it. Nevertheless, it is not wholly a sign of weakness among the men who are pressing forward, as yet in loose array, but presently to form a solid phalanx. It shows that these distinctly modern thinkers are largely independent thinkers, who will not allow themselves to be united by superstitious or emotional catchwords, but await the clear illumination of reasoned wisdom, to be to them what the vanishing bond of dogmatic authority was to their fathers.
Broadly speaking, advanced thinkers are now of four principal types: (1) Rationalists, who lay supreme stress on the growth and consolidation of science, and the accompanying warfare with superstition ; (2) Ethicists— the modern Stoics— who lay supreme stress on the cultivation of character, and obedience to duty; (3) Hedonistic Individualists— the modern Epicureans— who lay supreme stress on individual liberty, and the rational enjoyment of life; (4) Socialistic thinkers, who lay supreme stress on the regeneration of society by increased sympathy and economic organization.
IRival IDicws of advancement.
Vh a t is an “ advanced” thinker? The cynical time- .„ e r would perhaps s a y : “ One who is far gone on the
O f course these four classes of thinkers tend to overlap one another, and they must increasingly overlap, if the solidarity of advanced thought is ever to be realized ; but, at present, they form fairly distinct parties, which are mutually estranged, if not antagonistic.
d to madness.” The self-satisfied and sanctimonious °ehever in that supreme superstition, “ Whatever is is best,”
uld probably make answer: “ One who leads men on he highway to destruction.” Both would be speaking rom mere prejudice. Neither need be heeded. Certainly 'a d vanced” thought is apt to run to foolish, occasionally dangerous, extremes; but take it on the whole, and what muld the world be without it ? There would be no world, n man’s peculiar sense of the term. Every institution of ivilized life which is now recognised as good or useful has lescended lineally from the thoughts of advanced thinkers, ho were madmen to the cynics, and heretics to the zealots, if their day. They were ridiculous ; but the laugh is now in their side. They were impious ; but now their graves re set in the temple of humanity, and oblivion is the best hing that can happen to the memory of their bigoted letractors. . , ,, ,
A d v a n c e d th in kers, in the proper sense o f the term , are hose who harbour a deep, yet healthy, discontent with hings which average men accept favourably or indifferently. [Tm things in question may be current beliefs and sentinents current social customs, or current political institutions. I’he advanced thinker desires to destroy such beliefs and
The typical Rationalist is a great stickler for intellect. Thereby he incurs the opprobrium of the sentimentalist and the scorn of the excessively “ practical ” man ; while the ardent ethical and the enthusiastic votary of social reform look askance at his somewhat negative propaganda. Yet he has one advantage over his enemies and rivals. When they want to dispute or exhort, they are all obliged to dispute or exhort within h is province. Do they despise mere intellect ? Then let them leave it alone, and act and feel, if they can, without thinking— needless to say, without holding forth. Let them be unintelligent and devoutly silent examplars of their anti-intellectual doctrine; though even that doctrine cannot be entertained without an abortive ray of intellect. I f they will not consent to efface themselves, let them remember that to discourse on the superiority of action, feeling, and duty to thought is not to perform the action, perceive the feeling, or obey the duty contemplated. It is to formulate statements, whose general worth or worthlessness must be logically estimated, even if it cannot be gauged by the evidential logic which exact science demands. Thus, in thinking about practice, our first aim is not a practical, but an intellectual, aim. It is simply the truth as regards practice; the correspondence of the thought to the natural possibilities or obligations of practice. Reason is as necessary in this case as in the most abstract spheres of speculation.
timents as seem to him wholly harmful, such laws or restitutions as seem to him utterly unjust. He also wishes o improve those beliefs, sentiments, customs, or institutions vhich he deems faulty, yet essentially capable of improvement In the present day the progressive aim of improving he imperfect has largely superseded the revolutionary aim 5f removing the positively injurious; yet it is well to -emember that direct falsehoods cannot be turned into ruths without being destroyed in the process; and there re likewise some customs and institutions which cannot Possibly be nursed into human usefulness. They need only ;o be annihilated. ’ Probably all who can fairly claim to be advanced thinkers of the present day would admit the force of the foregoing generalizations. Yet “ those who march in the van ” do not, by any means, agree as to the particular lines on which the advance should be made. This lack of union among ^them
In w illin g, however, the aim is, not truth, but reality; the realization, through those possibilities which knowledge reveals, of those obligations which feeling imposes. Here, then, the Ethical takes his stand; and he may point out that there are two kinds of will— the will to reflect as well as the will to do— and that in either case there is an imperative duty to will the best that is in us. Without the conscientious resolve to reflect, we should either not reflect at all, or reflect only as irresponsible fancy and selfish bias dictated. Thus, while the objectified province of reasoned thought seems to belong to the Rationalist, the sole road by which that province can be entered seems to belong to the Ethical. The typical Ethical is more conscious of the latter than the former aspect of the question. He is intent on elevating the claims of the righteous will above those of
