Z b c

Xttetatv» (5utòe

AND RATIONALIST REVIEW.

[ESTABLISHED 1885.]

N o . 2 5 . (N ew Series.)

J U L Y I , 1898.

Monthly ; Twopence.

Contents.

The Basis ok Christian Conviction. By Charles T.

Gorham .

The Existence of the Soul. By Adam

Gowans

Whyte .

“ No Popery.” By F. J. Gould .

MRS. Ward’s New Novel

The History of Conscience .

The Mystery of Life .

A New T heory of Creation .

reasonable Faith

“ Christ Gave Aristides His Love of Justice

Signs and Warnings

Random Jottings .

The Fatal Rainbow : The Polychrom e B ib le

Innocent Law-breakers rationalism in the Magazines

Monthly Magazines and Short Notices

PAGE

97

98

99

99

IOO

IOI

102

'°3

103

103

IO4

105

106

107

108

Gbe Basis of Christian Conviction.

G r e a t numbers o f persons cling to religious dogmas not because they know them to be true, but because they f e e l them to be true. I f asked on what the feeling is based, they have no satisfactory reply to give. The testimony o f such persons to religious truth is valueless, because it not merely reverses the natural order o f development, but leaves the primary factor out o f account altogether. It does not exactly “ put the cart before the horse” ; it honestly believes the vehicle goes by itself.

A l l beliefs have a two-fold aspect. There is, first, the perception by the intellectual faculty that certain statements presented to it are found on examination to be true. There is secondly, the emotional activity aroused by the contemplation o f those true statements, and prompting actions in accordance therewith. Many convictions belong to the former category alone, to the sphere o f knowledge unaided b y emotion ; but emotion cannot exist without some basis of knowledge, however slender. T o assume the validity o f the second factor in the absence o f the first is to exalt the heart at the expense o f the head, and is the process by which the extravagances o f emotional religion have so often sanctified

T h is illogical attitude of giving Reason the cold shoulder in matters on which Reason should hold the deciding voice is far from unnatural among the uncultured, who neither examine facts nor analyse feelings. But it is at first sight somewhat surprising that the same attitude should be taken up by the cultured Christian. That a Regius Professor o f Theology at Oxford should avow such an untenable claim is an illustration o f th e clerical tendency to retrograde movements. This, however, is what Dr. Moberly does in the preface to his recent volume on The M in i s t e r ia l P r iesth ood . Possibly, on d o s e r examination, there is nothing surprising about it. The Rationalist can quite understand why the impartial study of facts is deprecated by the Christian teacher. The results of such a study are apt to prevent orthodox conceptions from being formed, and sometimes even destroy them when in active existence. Dr. Moberly maintains that, in the absence o f what he terms “ constitutive first principles,” the study o f details is useless and barren. Judging from the context, we should have thought that “ theological prejudices ” would have been a simpler term than “ constitutive first principles ” ; but, however that may he, the question naturally arises, How are these first principles arrived a t? They may be derived from direct authority; they may result from the indirect influence o f traditional ideas ; but in so far as they are o f the slightest value to the individual they must be the outcome of his own thought, o f his own examination o f facts ; in other words, the details come first and the principles afterwards — an incomplete synthesis may be utterly misleading. Principles cannot be intelligently held without cognizance o f the facts which form their foundations. Such a view holds good with regard to all branches o f knowledge, even the fluctuating and hypothetical “ science ’ ’ o f theology. We are told that “ constitutive first principles ’’ are necessary in theology. But as we are not told why they are necessary, we may assume that it is to prop up conclusions which could not otherwise be supported, and which are in themselves in capable o f verification. Whence and how constitutive first principles are obtained is of the utmost importance. Their proper basis is a basis o f Fact.

Dr. Moberly goes on to say that “ the cogency o f evidence, nay, its whole value, and even meaning, depends absolutely on the mental convictions with which we approach it.” This is an astonishing line o f argument. There is no doubt a sense in which the value o f evidence does become modified by the personal predilections of those who examine i t ; hut that is merely an imperfection to be avoided as far as possible. T o assert that the whole value and even meaning of evidence depends absolutely on prior mental convictions is equivalent to asserting that evidence itself is of no value whatever, that it is a superfluity. Everything is thus referred to the subjective feeling, as if the necessary objective element o f truth had no existence. Yet it is a truism that mental convictions vary strikingly with the temperament, environment, training, and other influences which surround the individual. How, then, can they be treated as the best, and indeed the only, criterion of truth ?

If, therefore, o f the two factors mentioned by Dr. Moberly, the one, the evidence, is to be disregarded as valueless, and the other, the mental conviction, is so variable as to be useless to anyone but its owner, it would appear that we are reduced to a state o f universal scepticism, with no reliable standard o f truth either within or without us. Dr. Moberly implies that it is only when the object o f the search for truth has already been attained that the search itself can properly commence ! With the theologian this may indeed be the case, but with the scientific inquirer it is not so. T h e decrees o f science are based on facts— facts positively and patiently ascertained ; and with these facts theology ought to be, but is not, in harmony.

T h e reference to miracles by which Dr. Moberly illustrates his point is somewhat inconclusive. It amounts to this, that, if he were convinced that miracles never happened, he would, as a theologian, leave the supernatural out of a cco u n t ; but that if, on the contrary, he were convinced “ in heart and conscience ” that Christ is an incarnation o f God, miracles would to him be an “ inherent necessity o f thought.” That a rational theologian should eliminate the supernatural is consistent and reasonable, but we should not expect him to do so without having looked at the evidence for its reality. Neither belief nor disbelief in the miraculous can rightly exist independently of and apart from the evidence. T h e controversy about miracles is not as to their possibility, but as to their actual occurrence— not whether they m ight have occurred, but whether they d id occur. Now, this is not a question for the “ heart and conscience ” to decide. It is