Skip to main content
Read page text
page 1
TTbc Xtteran? (Stube AND R A T IO N A L I S T R E V IE W . [ESTABLISHED 1885.] No. 3 1 . (New Series.) JA N U A R Y i, 1899. Monthly ; T wopence. Contents. PA G E Agnosticism and Duty. By Charles T. Gorham . 1 Veracity in Religion. Ily Amos Waters . . 2 T he F inished Work of Christ. By F. J. Gould . 3 The Life Story of a Metaphysician . . . 3 New Light on the Old T estament . . -4 Philosophy on a New Footing . . . . 5 Rambles in Religion . . . . . 6 The Psychology of Peoples . . . . 6 “ T he Agnostic Annual” . . . . 7 Chimes from the E thical Belfry . . . 7 Unrest: A Sonnet. By Charles T. Gorham . . 8 Random J ottings . . . . . . 8 A Visit to T homas Carlyle. I5y J. B. Crozier . 9 S igns and Warnings . . . . . 1 1 Rationalism in the Magazines . . . . 1 2 Short Notices and Correspondence . . . 1 3 Agnosticism nnö Dut\>. T here is a class of thinkers who maintain that Agnosticism is logically committed to a denial not merely of theological dogmas, but of the conception embodied in the term “ duty.” Agnosticism, Mr. Mallock has said, is “ cowardly, not because it does not dare to affirm the authority of Christ, but because it does not dare to deny the meaning and the reality of duty.” This is worth a little consideration. What is Agnosticism? It is not a creed, or a system ; it is rather a method, a principle of thought which recognises the limitations of human knowledge, which imposes on a man the duty of refusing to say he knows that which he does not know. That our knowledge has limits is clear to all, and is admitted by all. What those limits may be it is impossible to define, but no one can deny that they exist. No sane person can claim to know everything, and, probably, no sane person exists who knows absolutely nothing. Evidently the rational attitudeis between the twoextremes. There is much that he knows, and there is also much that he does not know. As regards that which he does know, his knowledge is as full and accurate as that of any other person. As regards that which he does not know, the term “ Agnosll<jisrn ” *s a convenient way of expressing his limitations. Effort may remove much of his ignorance, but it cannot remove all ; there must always remain an unexplored residue. A0 the Agnostic, at least, the doctrines of religion lie within ne category of this unexplored residue, and he points to the conflicting ideas of those who think' otherwise as evidence ,J.at they are in reality no wiser in that respect than himself. ne fact that religious thinkers are compelled to purify r ' f ' r PoncePtions of God as human ideas become more c ined ; that they are continually discarding the past conceptions men every whit as earnest in their faith as them- v<?s >,s surely a presumption that their conceptions of God asr). • the reflection of their own knowledge and their own mak'atl° nS ’ •^at’ *n ^act> man ma^es> and cannot help j InSi God in his own image. But while recognising his to ? rance the unseen, the Agnostic cannot fairly be said He L Ve no r'Sht to the knowledge which he has gained, exisflaS same eedainty as the Christian has of his own Th fe?.Ce an.^ the existence of the external universe, valfri c^a*ms no knowledge of another world is not a reason for disputing his knowledge of this. To the knowledge of the wide realms of nature and of the manifold life of man the Agnostic holds as firmly as anyone else, and he is quite as fully entitled to retain it. Now, the question for us is : Did the conception of duty arise within this field of human life and aspiration, or was it forced on man from an external and divine source ? In a word, Is duty of natural or supernatural origin ? To the Agnostic this question admits of but one answer. Duty is to him a perfectly natural conception, an inevitable development in the life of such a being as man. Given a being possessing powers of reasoning, and living in association with a number of other beings possessing similar capacities, it is clear that rules governing their relations with one another must ere long be developed. Certain forms of conduct injure those other beings, and reduce their happiness. Other forms of conduct benefit them, and add to their happiness. The man who slays another not only deprives his enemy of the continued enjoyment of life, but deprives that enemy’s friends and relations of a portion of their enjoyment of life. A law to punish and repress such conduct inevitably arises, and with it the obligation to obedience. So with theft, so with slander, so—in varying degrees—with every act which causes, or tends to cause, unhappiness. And the laws which are good for one are good for all. I f a primitive savage borrows a flint axe from another primitive savage, it is not very difficult for his tribe to see that he has to give it back, or something of equal value, in return. He owes a debt, and, if he refuses to pay it, force may fairly be used to compel him to do so. From this simple rule of justice the term “ ought ” arises. Essentially the word does not imply unselfish emotion, but physical coercion. In some European languages both conceptions are expressed by the same word ; even in our own their signification is etymologically the same. There is no sufficient warrant for the use of “ ought ” as if it not merely embodied a higher conception than “ owe,” but had no relation to it. The word “ obligation ” equally implies coercive force; it refers to something for the neglect of which a person is liable to be punished. So clear and so important is this sense of obligation that the welfare of the community requires its enforcement, since each citizen would suffer loss if it were held to be universally allowable to borrow' without repaying. As human relationships become more complex, and human ideas widen into ever greater comprehensiveness, this sense of obligation expands, is applied to other cases, takes on new and higher meanings, till the feeling of obligation becomes a great power, regulating the individual conduct without the slightest external compulsion, and a distinct conception of duty is formed. That this conception transcends its lowly origin, that it will operate sometimes to the prejudice of its possessor, is no argument against the simple fact of its development. It has grown with the growing life, and been strengthened by the heart-throbs of humanity. Why, then, should the Agnostic, of all men, “ deny its meaning and reality” ? This is not only a feasible explanation of how duty may have originated ; it is, we conceive, the fact that it did so originate. Such a view is in harmony with the whole of life, which is continually increasing in complexity and breadth of outlook; and writers like Mr. Mallock, who seek to bring the human mind into subjection to the preposterous claims of a decrepit Church, are doing their utmost to fetter liberty of thought and reverse the inevitable development of a world which they claim to be under supernatural guidance. I f duty did not originate in a natural manner, how did it originate? Those who maintain that it resulted from supernatural interposition are bound to prove the fact of such interposition,

Page Text

View plaintext

TTbc Xtteran? (Stube

AND R A T IO N A L I S T R E V IE W .

[ESTABLISHED 1885.]

No. 3 1 . (New Series.)

JA N U A R Y i, 1899.

Monthly ; T wopence.

Contents.

PA G E

Agnosticism and Duty. By Charles T. Gorham . 1 Veracity in Religion. Ily Amos Waters . . 2 T he F inished Work of Christ. By F. J. Gould . 3 The Life Story of a Metaphysician . . . 3 New Light on the Old T estament . . -4 Philosophy on a New Footing . . . . 5 Rambles in Religion . . . . . 6 The Psychology of Peoples . . . . 6 “ T he Agnostic Annual” . . . . 7 Chimes from the E thical Belfry . . . 7 Unrest: A Sonnet. By Charles T. Gorham . . 8 Random J ottings . . . . . . 8 A Visit to T homas Carlyle. I5y J. B. Crozier . 9 S igns and Warnings . . . . . 1 1 Rationalism in the Magazines . . . . 1 2 Short Notices and Correspondence . . . 1 3

Agnosticism nnö Dut\>. T here is a class of thinkers who maintain that Agnosticism is logically committed to a denial not merely of theological dogmas, but of the conception embodied in the term “ duty.” Agnosticism, Mr. Mallock has said, is “ cowardly, not because it does not dare to affirm the authority of Christ, but because it does not dare to deny the meaning and the reality of duty.” This is worth a little consideration.

What is Agnosticism? It is not a creed, or a system ; it is rather a method, a principle of thought which recognises the limitations of human knowledge, which imposes on a man the duty of refusing to say he knows that which he does not know. That our knowledge has limits is clear to all, and is admitted by all. What those limits may be it is impossible to define, but no one can deny that they exist. No sane person can claim to know everything, and, probably, no sane person exists who knows absolutely nothing. Evidently the rational attitudeis between the twoextremes. There is much that he knows, and there is also much that he does not know. As regards that which he does know, his knowledge is as full and accurate as that of any other person. As regards that which he does not know, the term “ Agnosll

ne fact that religious thinkers are compelled to purify r ' f ' r PoncePtions of God as human ideas become more c ined ; that they are continually discarding the past conceptions men every whit as earnest in their faith as them-

v,s surely a presumption that their conceptions of God asr). • the reflection of their own knowledge and their own mak'atl° nS ’ •^at’ *n ^act> man ma^es> and cannot help j InSi God in his own image. But while recognising his to ? rance the unseen, the Agnostic cannot fairly be said He L Ve no r'Sht to the knowledge which he has gained, exisflaS same eedainty as the Christian has of his own Th fe?.Ce an.^ the existence of the external universe, valfri c^a*ms no knowledge of another world is not a reason for disputing his knowledge of this. To the knowledge of the wide realms of nature and of the manifold life of man the Agnostic holds as firmly as anyone else, and he is quite as fully entitled to retain it.

Now, the question for us is : Did the conception of duty arise within this field of human life and aspiration, or was it forced on man from an external and divine source ? In a word, Is duty of natural or supernatural origin ?

To the Agnostic this question admits of but one answer. Duty is to him a perfectly natural conception, an inevitable development in the life of such a being as man. Given a being possessing powers of reasoning, and living in association with a number of other beings possessing similar capacities, it is clear that rules governing their relations with one another must ere long be developed. Certain forms of conduct injure those other beings, and reduce their happiness. Other forms of conduct benefit them, and add to their happiness. The man who slays another not only deprives his enemy of the continued enjoyment of life, but deprives that enemy’s friends and relations of a portion of their enjoyment of life. A law to punish and repress such conduct inevitably arises, and with it the obligation to obedience. So with theft, so with slander, so—in varying degrees—with every act which causes, or tends to cause, unhappiness. And the laws which are good for one are good for all. I f a primitive savage borrows a flint axe from another primitive savage, it is not very difficult for his tribe to see that he has to give it back, or something of equal value, in return. He owes a debt, and, if he refuses to pay it, force may fairly be used to compel him to do so. From this simple rule of justice the term “ ought ” arises. Essentially the word does not imply unselfish emotion, but physical coercion. In some European languages both conceptions are expressed by the same word ; even in our own their signification is etymologically the same. There is no sufficient warrant for the use of “ ought ” as if it not merely embodied a higher conception than “ owe,” but had no relation to it. The word “ obligation ” equally implies coercive force; it refers to something for the neglect of which a person is liable to be punished. So clear and so important is this sense of obligation that the welfare of the community requires its enforcement, since each citizen would suffer loss if it were held to be universally allowable to borrow' without repaying. As human relationships become more complex, and human ideas widen into ever greater comprehensiveness, this sense of obligation expands, is applied to other cases, takes on new and higher meanings, till the feeling of obligation becomes a great power, regulating the individual conduct without the slightest external compulsion, and a distinct conception of duty is formed. That this conception transcends its lowly origin, that it will operate sometimes to the prejudice of its possessor, is no argument against the simple fact of its development. It has grown with the growing life, and been strengthened by the heart-throbs of humanity. Why, then, should the Agnostic, of all men, “ deny its meaning and reality” ? This is not only a feasible explanation of how duty may have originated ; it is, we conceive, the fact that it did so originate. Such a view is in harmony with the whole of life, which is continually increasing in complexity and breadth of outlook; and writers like Mr. Mallock, who seek to bring the human mind into subjection to the preposterous claims of a decrepit Church, are doing their utmost to fetter liberty of thought and reverse the inevitable development of a world which they claim to be under supernatural guidance. I f duty did not originate in a natural manner, how did it originate? Those who maintain that it resulted from supernatural interposition are bound to prove the fact of such interposition,

read next page

My Bookmarks

Buy this Book
Skip to main content