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THE TABLET September 22ad, 1956. VOL. 208. 6070 TH E TABLET Published as a Newspaper A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER & REVIEW Pro Ecclesia Dei, Pro Regina et Patria FOUNDED IN 1840 SEPTEMBER 22nd, 1956 NINEPENCE A Date for Ghana : The New Role of Europeans in Africa Ollt of the Catacombs l Cardinal Griffin’s Assessment of the Church in Post-War England Christianity and the Oriental Cultures: 1 : By Christopher Dawson “The Story of a Soul : The Authentic Text. By Lancelot C. Sheppard “Pax Christi in Congress: A Gathering at Valladolid. By the Bishop of Salford Critics’ Columns : Notebook : Book Reviews : Letters : Chess CAPE OR SWORD r F'HE users of the Canal meet again in London, to consider -1 'the next steps they should take in their common interest. Last time it was to agree on a common scheme for international control, which was then explained to the Egyptian President, and flatly rejected by him. But his offer to negotiate a settlement still stands. Mr. Menzies had no authority to negotiate, only to expound. The legality of the nationalisation can also be tested, as far as Colonel Nasser is concerned, at The Hague, and although what he has done seems prima facie a breach of recently confirmed undertakings, the User countries seem unwilling to rest their case on that. They want to be able to show that he has refused the passage of the Canal and so broken the Convention of 1888, and to send a trial convoy to prove it. On the nationalisation issue they would be unlikely to secure the support of two-thirds of the United Nations Assembly. Far too many countries are potential nationalisers, and all are keenly sensitive about their sovereignty. For the unrestricted and secure use of the Canal there would be much more support. But if such use can be solemnly declared a charge and responsibility of Egypt towards the United Nations, that can easily mean nothing; if it rests with the United Nations, ships for Israel would enjoy free access to the Canal. That is the vanity of any purely legalistic compromise, that it can at any time be set aside by the Egyptian Army and police. But it does not at all follow that there is a sufficient remedy in either military or economic measures. To seize and hold the Canal is presumably what is in the minds of the strongarm school, but they never seem to envisage where we go from there, how we protect also the oil and the pipe-lines which would be the object of immediate and sustained attacks, of kinds against which defence is only possible where local Governments and populations are on our side, as they would not be. It is highly improbable that the Canal held against a hostile Egypt would be the safe passageway that it is the object of our policy to secure. So there is now much more talk of doing without the Canal, with American help. But this policy, which would have had great prospects if it had been set about calmly and with little said, as a business community’s response to the new uncertainties of Egyptian policy, has much worse prospects as an alternative form of waging a kind of war. A general agreement to face the extra cost involved in a boycott of the Canal becomes much more feasible if the United States is a constructive participant. But there will be many ship-owners registered under the Panamanian or Liberian flags who will be tempted to see a chance of extra profits if they become the main users of an Egyptian-run Canal. It is not clear what the Governments in the London Conference can do about them. Fundamentally what is at issue is the human relationship, the feeling of human beings all through Africa and Asia who are waiting to see how they are regarded by the peoples who adopted a frankly superior attitude to them until a few years ago, with the sense that they can be brought to heel by cutting off supplies or ending trade only a little less derogatory and humiliating than the avowed expectation that a display of military, naval or air power will suffice to cow them. So far the S,uez crisis has been like a game of chess badly played from both sides. Although President Nasser has had abundant verification of the truth that his position is strengthened whenever he acts and speaks moderately, and begins to convince the world that the French and British Governments lost their heads and tempers, he obviously finds moderation a difficult and unpalatable course, and is now engaging in reckless economic reprisals whose effect can only be to leave his country wholly dependent on the Soviet Union. This is his gesture of mortification at finding the Americans showing more solidarity for Britain and France, and is no doubt meant to show them where that course will end. Syria is the only one of the Arab States which might still go with Egypt however much of a Russian satellite the Nasser policies cause Egypt to become. The other Arab States are not ready for this, and are acutely alive to its dangers, and their rulers are particularly alive to the way a threat to their own position would quickly develop if Russian influence were to grow in their countries. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd on Wednesday reiterated Sir Anthony Eden’s essential point, that we can never accept the unrestricted control of the Canal by one Government or one man over the Canal; and any such statement logically involves having an international force in the Canal Zone, which only two years ago we were content to evacuate.

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THE TABLET September 22ad, 1956. VOL. 208. 6070

TH E TABLET

Published as a Newspaper

A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER & REVIEW

Pro Ecclesia Dei, Pro Regina et Patria

FOUNDED IN 1840 SEPTEMBER 22nd, 1956

NINEPENCE

A Date for Ghana : The New Role of Europeans in Africa

Ollt of the Catacombs l Cardinal Griffin’s Assessment of the Church in Post-War England

Christianity and the Oriental Cultures: 1 : By Christopher Dawson

“The Story of a Soul : The Authentic Text. By Lancelot C. Sheppard

“Pax Christi in Congress: A Gathering at Valladolid. By the Bishop of Salford

Critics’ Columns : Notebook : Book Reviews : Letters : Chess

CAPE OR SWORD

r F'HE users of the Canal meet again in London, to consider

-1 'the next steps they should take in their common interest. Last time it was to agree on a common scheme for international control, which was then explained to the Egyptian President, and flatly rejected by him. But his offer to negotiate a settlement still stands. Mr. Menzies had no authority to negotiate, only to expound. The legality of the nationalisation can also be tested, as far as Colonel Nasser is concerned, at The Hague, and although what he has done seems prima facie a breach of recently confirmed undertakings, the User countries seem unwilling to rest their case on that. They want to be able to show that he has refused the passage of the Canal and so broken the Convention of 1888, and to send a trial convoy to prove it. On the nationalisation issue they would be unlikely to secure the support of two-thirds of the United Nations Assembly. Far too many countries are potential nationalisers, and all are keenly sensitive about their sovereignty. For the unrestricted and secure use of the Canal there would be much more support. But if such use can be solemnly declared a charge and responsibility of Egypt towards the United Nations, that can easily mean nothing; if it rests with the United Nations, ships for Israel would enjoy free access to the Canal. That is the vanity of any purely legalistic compromise, that it can at any time be set aside by the Egyptian Army and police. But it does not at all follow that there is a sufficient remedy in either military or economic measures. To seize and hold the Canal is presumably what is in the minds of the strongarm school, but they never seem to envisage where we go from there, how we protect also the oil and the pipe-lines which would be the object of immediate and sustained attacks, of kinds against which defence is only possible where local Governments and populations are on our side, as they would not be. It is highly improbable that the Canal held against a hostile Egypt would be the safe passageway that it is the object of our policy to secure. So there is now much more talk of doing without the Canal, with American help. But this policy, which would have had great prospects if it had been set about calmly and with little said, as a business community’s response to the new uncertainties of Egyptian policy, has much worse prospects as an alternative form of waging a kind of war.

A general agreement to face the extra cost involved in a boycott of the Canal becomes much more feasible if the United States is a constructive participant. But there will be many ship-owners registered under the Panamanian or Liberian flags who will be tempted to see a chance of extra profits if they become the main users of an Egyptian-run Canal. It is not clear what the Governments in the London Conference can do about them.

Fundamentally what is at issue is the human relationship, the feeling of human beings all through Africa and Asia who are waiting to see how they are regarded by the peoples who adopted a frankly superior attitude to them until a few years ago, with the sense that they can be brought to heel by cutting off supplies or ending trade only a little less derogatory and humiliating than the avowed expectation that a display of military, naval or air power will suffice to cow them.

So far the S,uez crisis has been like a game of chess badly played from both sides. Although President Nasser has had abundant verification of the truth that his position is strengthened whenever he acts and speaks moderately, and begins to convince the world that the French and British Governments lost their heads and tempers, he obviously finds moderation a difficult and unpalatable course, and is now engaging in reckless economic reprisals whose effect can only be to leave his country wholly dependent on the Soviet Union. This is his gesture of mortification at finding the Americans showing more solidarity for Britain and France, and is no doubt meant to show them where that course will end. Syria is the only one of the Arab States which might still go with Egypt however much of a Russian satellite the Nasser policies cause Egypt to become. The other Arab States are not ready for this, and are acutely alive to its dangers, and their rulers are particularly alive to the way a threat to their own position would quickly develop if Russian influence were to grow in their countries.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd on Wednesday reiterated Sir Anthony Eden’s essential point, that we can never accept the unrestricted control of the Canal by one Government or one man over the Canal; and any such statement logically involves having an international force in the Canal Zone, which only two years ago we were content to evacuate.

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