THE TABLET August 29th. 1959. VOL. 213. No. 6223
TH E TABLET A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER & REVIEW
Published as a Newspaper
Pro Ecclesia Dei, Pro Regina et Patria
FOUNDED IN 184 0
AUGUST 29th, 1959
N1NEPENCE
America s Allies: President E is enhow e r’s Objective
Catholic Secondary Education : The T a sk A head. By P h ilip Bell, M.P.
Refugees in Hong Kong: C a th o lic Relief Work. By Charles H. V a th
The Life of Ronald Knox: I : Bishop K nox and his Son. By Evelyn W augh the Last Papal -flagship: A Beautiful S team Yacht. By M ichael R. B ouquet
Pre-Christian Education : Jew ish, G reek and Rom an . By C h r is to pher Hollis
East and West: Recent E n counters of C a th o lic an d O rth odox
The Message of Fatima: R um ou rs R ep u d ia te d
Critics’ Columns : Notebook : Book Reviews : Chess
M. KHRUSHCHEV AND THE EXILES JVf KHRUSHCHEV has indicated to the American
Government that although he is not in law Head of a State, he wishes to be treated as such, being in fact as much the Chief of the Russian State, with a figurehead President, as the American President is in his country. The Russians are not alone in being insistent upon obtaining the maximum marks of respect in international intercourse, but the nice distinctions th a t might be made in the structure of hospitality are not really very important fo r either the American or the Russian public. It is much more important, and M. Khrushchev would do well to consider, th a t the United States today holds very great numbers of Central and Eastern Europeans whose private lives have been darkened by tragedy because Soviet Russia has so ruthlessly deprived their countries of political freedom.
For over ten years now, the American Government has made a policy of collecting and looking after the refugee leaders of these conquered peoples. The country already had a large Polish community. I t now has large numbers of Hungarians. M. Khrushchev’s visit to London in the spring of 1956 at the invitation of Sir Anthony Eden aroused a good deal of protest : it would not have been possible a few months later, after events in Hungary had profoundly moved British public opinion. Today there is very strong and reasonable feeling in the States that, while it might be useful for M. Khrushchev to get the feel of Washington for him self, one of the things it is hoped he will realise is that there is an American public opinion which is quite independent of the Government, and which the Government has to respect, in a way M. Khrushchev may find it difficult to understand. Those Americans who attach great importance to the United Nations are acutely conscious that this, their first great experiment in trying to build an international institution in the cause of peace, has been humiliated and discredited by the flat Russian disregard of its verdict on Hungary. If M. Khrushchev appears before the United Nations, it ought to be as a defendant. It is carrying courtesy too far to provide him in New York with a world platform, even if he has the good sense not to try to use it to woo the Afro-Asian bloc. I t is still a misrepresentation of his country’s and his own role in the history of the United Nations, which has been almost always mischievous and destructive.
The Central and Eastern European communities in America do not represent a minor tragedy which can be left to one side in the conduct of high policy, and President Eisenhower, before leaving for Europe, judged it well to say explicitly that their interests will not be overlooked. What a totally different prospect for the fruitfulness of M. Khrushchev’s visit would be opened up if he agreed that the fate of these countries must be part of the agenda, and th a t tension cannot really be relaxed until a way has been found of meeting the claims of Russian security by some less drastic method than the imposition of Communist Government with all its attendant ideological pressures on peoples to whom Communism and Russian overlordship are repugnant.
It is probably true that the reason for the Russian tanks in Budapest was more military than ideological; that M. Khrushchev was told by his military advisers that Hungary must be held because the Hungarian Plain leads too easily to the Ukraine. If the independence of Finland had been destroyed the same military argu