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United States Kerry must show the US is back Special envoy faces tough challenges in restoring America’s climate credibility, writes Rebecca Peters 34 In their first week, the Biden-Harris administration sent a clear message to Americans and estranged global allies by appointing John Kerry, the former secretary of state, as the first special presidential envoy on climate change. In , Kerry served as a key architect of the Paris Agreement on climate change, a diplomatic breakthrough that seemed to herald an era of unprecedented cooperation between the largest carbon emitters – the United States and China. The watchword of the new administration is ‘America is back’. Considering that international expectations of the US return to multilateralism may be at odds with bitterly divided domestic views on climate action, the question is: back to what? Under the Trump administration, the US retreated from major international commitments and domestic leadership on climate change. In a first step to dismantle US environmental and climate policy six months into his presidency, Trump announced that America would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. On his first day in office, Biden rejoined it. Now, expectations are high in the run-up to the April Earth Day Summit, an event to be hosted by Biden that marks America’s formal return to global climate talks. How Kerry manages a fragmented landscape at home and abroad as he undertakes an expansive mandate f rom the new administration will shape the future of global climate action. Breaking domestic gridlock Domestic political tension casts doubt on America’s ability to follow through on climate action. Such scepticism is justifiable. Despite assertions of returning to leadership, past experience shows the US has little credibility on the issue. America’s poor record on climate action long preceded Trump. George WBush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in , and Congress has not considered serious climate legislation since it failed to pass carbon pricing in . Reinstating national environmental protections that were rolled back under Trump is a starting point. But without Congressional support, federal legislation to decarbonize energy, t ransport, infrastructure and agriculture will not pass. At the state and local level, where opportunities for carbon reduction do not require Congressional approval, the fossil fuel industry, including coal interests, often block action. Opinions on US prospects for climate progress are divided. Optimists, viewing local action as close to meeting Paris targets without waiting for federal action, point to sustained efforts from cities, states and businesses to meet the targets of reducing carbon emissions to net zero. On closer inspection, this optimism ignores the nuts and bolts of domestic policy change. While surveys show broad support among voters across the political spectrum for climate action, the devil is in the detail. For example, ‘pre-emption’ legislation – under which state or federal government can overrule local authorities – prevents the restriction of new gas infrastructure as part of net zero initiatives. The Arizona legislature blocked the city of Flagstaff’s plan to promote electrification, ostensibly on the grounds that it harmed consumers and would lead to higher prices. Time-worn ideological rifts about individual choice versus the urgency of collective action will not be resolved during the Biden-Harris administration. To ensure that international US climate commitments are not empty promises, a ‘team of rivals’ approach may be in order. The bipartisan Senate and House Climate Solutions Caucus already demonstrates that neither party holds monolithic views on climate policy. Rather, states need support to move away from a fossil fuel economy. A Republican party split, underscored by young conservatives supportive of initiatives including carbon dividends, presents an opportunity to develop policy to encourage local net zero plans while persuading laggards to devise a timeframe to align with local realities. Passionate opposition to federal intervention is only one of the challenges that Kerry and the administration face while paving the road to the COP climate change summit to be held in Glasgow in November. Building international confidence in American climate credibility, reassessing transatlantic relationships and navigating perilous waters with China will feature prominently. International climate cooperation faces the dual challenges of building trust and repositioning transatlantic relationships after the departure of Britain from the European Union. Establishing trust goes beyond contributions to the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility. Climate policy is as much about
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I M AG E S I A G E T T Y A F P V ‘Passionate opposition to federal intervention is only one of the challenges Kerry faces while paving the road to the COP climate change summit’ John Kerry, Biden’s climate envoy, salutes Barbara Pompili, the French ecological transition minister after their talks in Paris competition as it is about cooperation, meaning that new relationships with the EU and Britain will take on more significance. The spectre of the Trump administration’s f ights with China, combined with the Brexit shock, shifted European strategy with China, leading to a rushed EU investment agreement on the eve of Biden’s inauguration. The ‘soft’ EU approach towards China contrasts with early signals from the US that it will not insulate climate from broader issues with Beijing – including its tightening grip on Hong Kong, its treatment of Uighur Muslims, and the US designation of Huawei as a threat to national security. Zhao Lijian, spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has shot back at the US approach, arguing that no country can expect support if they ‘blatantly interfere with China’s domestic affairs and undermine China’s interests’. This retort suggests that significant progress, such as the Joint Announcement on Climate Change declared by President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama in , may not emerge in the near future. Though the naming of veteran negotiator Xie Zhenhua as China’s climate envoy is viewed as a bright spot to preserve climate diplomacy, the high-level US-China talks in Alaska in March suggested the continuation of tense relations. While Kerry’s preference is to promote climate in a cooperative US-China relationship, careful evaluation of the Biden administration’s wider priorities through talks with the Department of State, Department of Defence, and National Security Affairs will be needed. Otherwise, a ‘grand bargain’ agenda from Kerry risks complicating foreign policy concerns, including intense economic competition and expanded Chinese military activity in the South China Sea. Looking to the future, Biden expects that Kerry will be at the head of every table. But key partners are reluctant to return to their former position as second chair. For the US to take a strong stance in negotiations it will need to act through coalitions. This alliance may not come from the EU, where both French and German partners face a strained relationship with the US. Emmanuel Macron, the French president, unenthusiastic about the prospect of a ‘Chinese-American duopoly’, is promoting the idea of European strategic autonomy. Alignment with Britain, which is fleshing out its global role after leaving the EU, may provide some of the strategic leverage that the US requires. With British support in UK-hosted forums such as the G and COP , Kerry would be better positioned to call for ambitious climate targets, particularly in countries that have not agreed to sufficient climate action. Sustaining action The early days of the Biden-Harris administration saw executive orders on ‘putting the climate crisis at the centre of US foreign policy and national security’. But executive orders are not a strategy in themselves. The institutional backing that Kerry enjoys in the new administration – a whole-of-government approach to climate policy, a National Climate Task Force, and a seat on the National Security Council – will mean little unless international commitments align with concrete domestic action to achieve Paris targets. In his first speech as secretary of state in , Kerry said that ‘the decisions that we make from the safety of our shores don’t just ripple outwards; they also create a current right here in America’. Before the Earth Day Summit and COP , both the outward ripple and the inbound current need to show allies and adversaries alike that the US is back and can deliver sustained climate action at home and abroad. Rebecca Peters is an Academy Fellow with Chatham House’s Energy, Environment and Resources Programme 35

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United States

Kerry must show the US is back Special envoy faces tough challenges in restoring America’s climate credibility, writes Rebecca Peters

34

In their first week, the Biden-Harris administration sent a clear message to Americans and estranged global allies by appointing John Kerry, the former secretary of state, as the first special presidential envoy on climate change. In , Kerry served as a key architect of the Paris Agreement on climate change, a diplomatic breakthrough that seemed to herald an era of unprecedented cooperation between the largest carbon emitters – the United States and China.

The watchword of the new administration is ‘America is back’. Considering that international expectations of the US return to multilateralism may be at odds with bitterly divided domestic views on climate action, the question is: back to what?

Under the Trump administration, the US retreated from major international commitments and domestic leadership on climate change. In a first step to dismantle US environmental and climate policy six months into his presidency, Trump announced that America would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. On his first day in office, Biden rejoined it.

Now, expectations are high in the run-up to the April Earth Day Summit, an event to be hosted by Biden that marks America’s formal return to global climate talks. How Kerry manages a fragmented landscape at home and abroad as he undertakes an expansive mandate f rom the new administration will shape the future of global climate action.

Breaking domestic gridlock Domestic political tension casts doubt on America’s ability to follow through on climate action. Such scepticism is justifiable. Despite assertions of returning to leadership, past experience shows the US has little credibility on the issue. America’s poor record on climate action long preceded Trump. George WBush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in , and Congress has not considered serious climate legislation since it failed to pass carbon pricing in .

Reinstating national environmental protections that were rolled back under Trump is a starting point. But without Congressional support, federal legislation to decarbonize energy, t ransport, infrastructure and agriculture will not pass. At the state and local level, where opportunities for carbon reduction do not require Congressional approval, the fossil fuel industry, including coal interests, often block action.

Opinions on US prospects for climate progress are divided. Optimists, viewing local action as close to meeting Paris targets without waiting for federal action, point to sustained efforts from cities, states and businesses to meet the targets of reducing carbon emissions to net zero.

On closer inspection, this optimism ignores the nuts and bolts of domestic policy change. While surveys show broad support among voters across the political spectrum for climate action, the devil is in the detail.

For example, ‘pre-emption’ legislation – under which state or federal government can overrule local authorities – prevents the restriction of new gas infrastructure as part of net zero initiatives. The Arizona legislature blocked the city of Flagstaff’s plan to promote electrification, ostensibly on the grounds that it harmed consumers and would lead to higher prices.

Time-worn ideological rifts about individual choice versus the urgency of collective action will not be resolved during the Biden-Harris administration.

To ensure that international US climate commitments are not empty promises, a ‘team of rivals’ approach may be in order. The bipartisan Senate and House Climate Solutions Caucus already demonstrates that neither party holds monolithic views on climate policy. Rather, states need support to move away from a fossil fuel economy.

A Republican party split, underscored by young conservatives supportive of initiatives including carbon dividends, presents an opportunity to develop policy to encourage local net zero plans while persuading laggards to devise a timeframe to align with local realities.

Passionate opposition to federal intervention is only one of the challenges that Kerry and the administration face while paving the road to the COP climate change summit to be held in Glasgow in November. Building international confidence in American climate credibility, reassessing transatlantic relationships and navigating perilous waters with China will feature prominently.

International climate cooperation faces the dual challenges of building trust and repositioning transatlantic relationships after the departure of Britain from the European Union. Establishing trust goes beyond contributions to the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility. Climate policy is as much about

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