political participation with access to the European market. Many, indeed, seem genuinely to have convinced themselves that the two things are identical.
It is worth stressing that no one – no one – is suggesting that Britain should disengage from European trade. Withdrawal from the EU does not imply withdrawal from the European market. Indeed, under Article 50 of the Lisbon treaty, the EU is obligated to negotiate a commercial accord with any state that leaves.
Britain might choose to remain in the European Economic Area, like Norway. Norwegian exports to the EU in 2010 were twice as much per head as Britain’s. Or it might prefer to leave the EEA, and rely on bilateral free-trade accords, like Switzerland. To repeat – for this fact cannot be repeated too often – Swiss exports to the EU in 2010 were four times as much per head as Britain’s.
Some protest that, while this might be the legal position, an acrimonious split could leave the EU looking for ways to erect unofficial non-tariff barriers against British trade. Why on earth should it want to do so, though, when the balance of such trade is overwhelmingly to the advantage of Continental exporters? Over the past 40 years, Britain has run a cumulative trade surplus with every continent on the planet except Europe. Between 2005 and 2010, the EU accounted for 92 per cent of our total trade deficit.3 It is hard to imagine that other
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